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CONFUSION  ISN’T  EVERYTHING†
William McGeveran* and Mark P. McKenna**
The typical shorthand justification for trademark rights centers on avoiding consumer con-
fusion.  But in truth, this encapsulation mistakes a method for a purpose: confusion merely
serves as an indicator of the underlying problems that trademark law seeks to prevent.  Other
areas of law accept confusion or mistake of all kinds, intervening only when those errors lead to
more serious harms.  Likewise, every theory of trademark rights considers confusion troubling
solely because it threatens more fundamental values such as fair competition or informative com-
munication.  In other words, when it comes to the deep purposes of trademark law, confusion
isn’t everything.
Yet trademark law’s structure now encourages courts to act otherwise, as if confusion itself
were the ultimate evil with which trademark law is concerned and as if its optimal level were zero.
Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion over the last half century while simul-
taneously expanding its scope to cover dramatically more situations.  As a result, trademark
rights conflicted more frequently with open markets and free speech.  Even when special doctrines
developed to protect those values, they tended to devolve back into confusion analysis.  In many
situations—often including examples such as trade dress, comparative advertising, or uses in
expressive works—competing values get short shrift from a framework preoccupied with eradicat-
ing confusion of any description.
This Article analyzes causes of this phenomenon, problems that result, and possible cures.  It
begins with a historical analysis demonstrating how the growth of confusion reasoning over-
whelmed inherent limits on trademark rights that once protected competition or communication
values.  It then explains the resulting damage.  Sometimes courts penalize socially valuable but
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unlicensed uses of marks; even when they probably would not find the uses infringing, the high
administrative costs imposed on defendants discourage such uses.  Finally, the Article proposes a
better alternative.  Courts should identify categories of cases implicating competition or communi-
cation values at the outset of litigation and should handle them differently than ordinary cases.
Sometimes courts should simply ignore confusion when enforcing trademark rights would cause
too much damage to other values.  In other cases, they should distinguish between types of confu-
sion; when balanced against important competing values, minimal or temporary confusion need
not be given the same weight as outright deception that diverts trade.  Our recommended
approach offers stronger and earlier protection for competition and communication.  It also puts
confusion detection back in its proper place—not as the ultimate purpose of trademark law, but
its tool.
INTRODUCTION
Ask any law student to describe the purpose of trademark law and you’re
likely to get a simple answer: preventing consumer confusion.  Indeed, you’d
likely get the same simple answer from most trademark lawyers.  Following in
this path, courts tend to view confusion itself as the ill that trademark law
seeks to cure and to assume that the optimal level of confusion is always zero.
Both these propositions are wrong.  The resulting errors undermine impor-
tant values, such as fair competition and effective communication, which
should lie at the heart of trademark law’s protection.
The first proposition mistakes trademark law’s mediate purpose for its
ultimate purpose.  Consumer confusion is but a symptom of the disease
targeted by trademark law.  Confusion ought to serve as a heuristic device to
identify situations where certain bad consequences may follow, including
diversion of trade and distorted purchasing decisions. 1  A small amount of
confusion does not inevitably cause problems, and it might even prove bene-
ficial in some cases where it serves as a prelude to greater understanding
(which, as we repeatedly tell our first-year law students, it often does).
Increasingly, however, courts have come to see elimination of consumer con-
fusion itself as the alpha and omega of trademark law.
This trend has increased ever since courts began developing multi-factor
tests for “likelihood of confusion” to measure infringement.2  The Lanham
Act now expressly identifies “confusion” as a basis for liability.3  And the
scope of that confusion, and therefore of trademark rights, has expanded
radically.  Courts (and later Congress) steadily added to the types of actiona-
ble confusion: concerning more relationships (such as “sponsorship or affili-
ation”); in connection with more protectable subject matter (such as product
packaging and design); and beyond the point of sale (such as initial interest
1 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413
(2010).
2 For a history of the development of the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test, see
Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible
Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2012).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (2006).
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or post-sale confusion).4  This inexorable growth brought trademarks into
much more frequent conflict with previously acceptable uses—often uses
that serve other crucial values of a well-functioning trademark system.
The singular focus on confusion eventually displaced previous under-
standings of a trademark’s purpose.5  By 2013, experienced judges on the
Second Circuit thought they were underscoring the absurdity of a fair use
test applied by the district court when they pointed out that it “would lead to
the dismissal of these claims without addressing what is beyond doubt the
central question in considering consumer confusion: whether consumers
were actually confused by the allegedly infringing product.”6  Not only is this
holding tautological, it assumes that every trademark case must turn on con-
fusion.  When it comes to the deep purposes of trademark law, however, con-
fusion isn’t everything.
The second error noted above—that the law always should strive to elim-
inate all confusion entirely—is related to the first.  Courts routinely interpret
statutory requirements by considering the classic question of the “mischief
sought to be avoided” by the law.7  This is especially so in an open-ended
statute like the Lanham Act that delegates interpretive authority to the
courts.8  But if the mischief to be avoided by trademark law is confusion
itself, courts understandably reason, then surely they should stamp it out
whenever it appears.9  This habit persists despite contrary indications in
trademark doctrine.  In a case involving descriptive fair use, the Supreme
4 For a full account of the expansion of confusion, see infra Section I.B.
5 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1839 (2007).
6 Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013).
7 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 71 (2012) (“In the construction of an ambiguous statute, it
is proper to take into consideration the particular evils at which the legislation is aimed, or
the mischief sought to be avoided . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see Awotin v. Atlas Exch. Nat’l
Bank of Chi., 295 U.S. 209, 214 (1935) (“The prohibition would be nullified and the evil
sought to be avoided would persist. . . .  Such a construction of the statute is inadmissi-
ble.”); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892) (“[A]nother guide to
the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy . . . .”).
8 Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 198
(2004).
9 While there is no absolute quantitative threshold for determining what level of con-
fusion is actionable, courts have been persuaded by surveys showing 15% confusion, and
sometimes even less. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc., 628 F.2d
500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a 15% level of confusion strong evidence of likelihood of
confusion); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979)
(upholding the district court’s finding that a 15–20% level of confusion corroborates likeli-
hood of confusion); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 279
(7th Cir. 1976) (finding that a 15% level of confusion was neither small nor de minimis).
In one case, the court called evidence of 8.5% confusion “strong evidence” of a likelihood
of confusion.  Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F.
Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
Lest those cases appear isolated and old, this past summer the court in Gucci America, Inc.
v. Guess?, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 207, 232, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), held that the defendant’s
products infringed because they were likely to cause post-sale confusion after finding that
256 notre dame law review [vol. 89:1
Court explicitly held that “some possibility of consumer confusion must be
compatible with fair use.”10  Functionality doctrine similarly disregards con-
fusion when its requirements are otherwise satisfied.11
This wisdom is not woven into the fabric of trademark law very well,
however.  Almost every so-called “defense” in trademark law relies in the end
on the absence of confusion rather than the presence of important alterna-
tive values.12  And the expansive definition of confusion means markholders
often can claim some malign influence on consumers.  We suggest historical
reasons for this doctrinal circularity below.13  Whatever the explanation, how-
ever, contemporary courts lack tools to consider values other than confusion
because they understand the elimination of all confusion to be the task at
hand.
This Article tackles both of these related misunderstandings of con-
sumer confusion in trademark law: the supposed role of confusion as the
law’s sole driving purpose and the imperative to reduce it to zero.  We trace
the development of the preoccupation with confusion, demonstrate its nega-
tive consequences, and suggest avenues for reform.
We begin with history.  Why do so many courts and other actors see elim-
ination of consumer confusion as the primary (perhaps even the sole) mis-
sion of trademark law?  Part I describes how courts traditionally relied on the
inherent limits of more narrowly defined trademark rights to protect socially
beneficial uses of a mark, obviating the need for special doctrines.  We then
show how those inherent limits eroded over time with the expansion of
rights.  Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion over the
last half century while simultaneously expanding the scope of that concept to
cover dramatically more situations.  These changes created more conflicts
between confusion and other values, yet left trademark law without the
capacity to adjudicate those conflicts efficiently.
We then elaborate on the problems caused by this state of affairs.  Part II
identifies other values, particularly fair competition and open communica-
tion, which can be threatened by trademark structures overly reliant on erad-
icating confusion.  It also explains how courts’ attempts to articulate new
limits on the scope of trademark rights largely failed because they recursively
relied on assessments of the now-overgrown confusion concept.  Cases involv-
ing socially valuable, but unlicensed, uses of marks present two distinct
problems.  First, current doctrine submerges the other values and perpetu-
ates the notion that preventing consumer confusion is itself the aim of trade-
mark law.  In response, courts tend systematically to overweigh confusion,
the surveys showed a maximum level of net confusion among casual observers in the post-
sale setting of only 5.8%.
10 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004).
11 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001);
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).
12 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 77–109
(2008).
13 See infra Part I.
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which they see as more essential to trademark law than any of those other
values.  Second, and at least as important, courts cannot dispose of cases early
in litigation because they generally cannot address competing values outside
a fact-intensive likelihood of confusion analysis.  As a result, even when an
unlicensed use of a mark ultimately would be found lawful, the user faces the
prospect of long and expensive litigation to validate that use.  These costs
discourage legitimate uses on the ground and increase the effectiveness of
cease-and-desist letters, including those that claim stronger rights than the
law really confers.
Finally, in Part III we take up the task of reforming trademark adjudica-
tion to better recognize and protect other values.  We propose a set of what
we call “limiting doctrines” to do so.  In civil procedure terms, some of these
are affirmative defenses, but we also include other doctrinal structures that
efficiently vindicate non-confusion interests served by a defendant’s
actions.14  In brief summary, we suggest that courts should first identify cate-
gories of cases that raise competing values, and then should handle these
identified types of cases differently at both the liability and remedy phases.
The sorting would leave the handling of most trademark cases undisturbed,
but would significantly change doctrine in the affected categories.  At the
liability phase, in some instances we propose categorical safe harbors for the
defendant, while in others we recommend a much more limited role for con-
fusion.  At the remedy phase, courts should remember that eradication of all
confusion is not their goal and limit their injunctive relief to those measures
necessary, on balance, to prevent serious harm to consumers.
Described at this level of generality, we realize that our premise can
seem abstract.  We will illustrate the approach with three fact patterns that
recur frequently and present conflicts between the elimination of confusion
on one hand, and interests in competition and communication on the other.
First, the ability to offer certain product features can be essential to compete
in a market, but use of those features may also give rise to trademark claims,
particularly as protection extends to more varieties of trade dress.  Function-
ality doctrine generally refuses protection for mechanical features like the
dual-spring design of a mechanism for keeping outdoor signs upright despite
adverse wind conditions.15  It much less consistently preserves access to com-
petitively important nonmechanical features such as the color on the sole of
a fashionable shoe.16  Second, unlicensed third parties often use a mark
when they promote their own products to consumers.  This situation arises
most obviously in the form of comparative advertising, but it also can come
14 See William McGeveran, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and Burdens, 1
IP THEORY 25, 31–32 (2010), available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol1/
iss1/2/.  So, for example, the requirement of nonfunctionality in the prima facie infringe-
ment case is a limiting doctrine in this sense.  So, too, are some of our remedial options
that are not full defenses from liability. See infra Part III.
15 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28–35 (2001).
16 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
216 (2d Cir. 2012).
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up when sellers, repairers, or brokers use a mark to explain their own services
to consumers. .17  The “classic” fair use scenario, in which a third party uses a
mark for its descriptive meaning in order to describe its own product or ser-
vice, presents similar conflicts between competitive purposes and confusion
reading.18  Finally, unauthorized expressive uses of marks—in media from oil
paintings to movies and video games—face trademark claims based on the
possibility that their audiences will become confused about an association
between the markholder and the expressive work.19  We will return to these
three—product features, third-party promotions, and uses in expressive
works—as concrete examples of situations that limiting doctrines should pro-
tect more effectively.  They embody core trademark values of fair competi-
tion (product features), open communication (uses in expressive works), or
both (comparative advertising and other third-party promotions).
As a final introductory note, we offer a quick preliminary response to a
sensible question we have often received about this project: if the breadth of
confusion is the root problem, why not simply make confusion narrower
again?  One of us has written extensively endorsing just such an approach,
and both of us continue to think it would be wise to alter the confusion
rationale along these lines.20  Nevertheless, for several reasons we think limit-
ing doctrines applied to particular uses also demand attention from courts,
scholars, and reformers.  First, more general efforts to scale back trademark
rights may prove unsuccessful, and in any event reversing decades of trade-
mark expansion would take time.  Our proposal gives courts concrete tools
they can use right now to protect other values when they are most seriously
threatened by trademark enforcement.  Second, current doctrine seldom
calls upon courts to think hard about the differences between types of confu-
sion or the varied types and degrees of harm they may cause, nor to consider
other important values aside from confusion.  Confronting courts more
directly with the costs of trademark overprotection should help nudge them
toward a more wide-ranging re-evaluation of confusion.  Third, even with a
more limited understanding of consumer confusion, there will always be
times when other values ought to take precedence over confusion for the
17 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.
2010) (considering suit against automobile broker unaffiliated with Lexus who used <buy-
a-lexus.com> as a domain name); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 619–20
(7th Cir. 1995) (upholding comparative use of competitor’s mark on candy packaging).
18 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114
(2004) (involving a dispute over variations of a single term found in one company’s trade-
mark that were used in a competitor’s product description).
19 See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.
2012) (alleging violation based on depiction of university football team logos and uniforms
in oil paintings); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097
(9th Cir. 2008) (claiming violation based on imitation of logo and building de´cor in video
game).
20 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 1, at 438–44; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McK-
enna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 151–54 (2010); see also McGeveran, supra
note 12, at 66–71 (criticizing focus on likelihood of confusion).
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good of the entire trademark regime and the markets it supports.  For exam-
ple, courts already disregard even confusion about actual source—the nar-
rowest and most traditional form of confusion—when they determine that
the disputed feature was functional.21  Given the unbroken history of
expanding rights, limiting doctrines probably will be essential to protect
other values important to the whole trademark system.  That certainly
doesn’t mean we should ignore problems with the confusion rationale.  But it
does mean that we cannot afford to ignore limiting doctrines.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
At one time, the inherently limited nature of trademarks did much of
the doctrinal work of trademark law.  As the Supreme Court famously said
almost a century ago in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., “[t]here is no
such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an
established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.”22  Put simply, trademark rights were naturally limited by their
purposes; as a result, many uses of a mark by other parties were not even
prima facie infringing.
As this Part explains, courts traditionally relied on these natural limits to
deny relief where the defendant’s use did not implicate trademark law’s con-
cerns.  That was generally enough to prevent serious conflicts between trade-
mark rights and other values such as competition or speech.  Over the last
several decades, however, trademark rights have expanded so much that con-
flicts are now much more frequent, and the old doctrinal formulations are
no longer sufficient to resolve them.
A. The Erosion of Inherent Limits in Trademark Rights
Until sometime in the early to mid-twentieth century, trademark law
(along with the broader law of unfair competition of which it has always been
a part) was designed for the limited purpose of preventing trade diversion by
competitors.  As Justice Strong wrote in Canal Co. v. Clark:
[I]n all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invaded, it
is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the
goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another; and that it is only
when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that the party
who appeals to a court of equity can have relief.  This is the doctrine of all
the authorities.23
21 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:63
(4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] (“Functionality is a potent public policy, for it
trumps all evidence of actual consumer identification of source and all evidence of actual
consumer confusion caused by an imitator.”).
22 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
23 80 U.S. 311, 322–23 (1872); see also Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U.S.
537, 546 (1891) (quoting the same passage from Canal Co. v. Clark).  The “essence of the
wrong” was the same in unfair competition cases that did not involve a technical trade-
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Nevertheless, courts in this era recognized that they had to be careful in
denouncing trade diversion—after all, capitalist competition consists inher-
ently of efforts to divert others’ customers.  Applied too broadly, unfair com-
petition law could undermine the benefits of a market economy.  Courts
guarded against overextension by carefully distinguishing between legitimate
forms of competition (“mere competition”) and illegitimate attempts to
divert trade.24  Deceptiveness was the point of demarcation: a defendant’s
use was actionable only if it deceived consumers and thereby diverted trade
that otherwise would have gone to the plaintiff.25  Because trademark rights
were so narrow in this era, courts were more willing to presume deception in
trademark infringement cases than in unfair competition, but both types of
cases turned on deception that resulted in the passing off of the defendant’s
goods as those of the plaintiff.26
mark. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“Th[e] essential
element is the same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompanied
with trade-mark infringement.”); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS,
TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4, at 12 (3d ed. 1917) (“The principles involved in
trademark cases and tradename cases have been substantially identical.”).
24 See, e.g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893) (“Rival manufactur-
ers may lawfully compete for the patronage of the public in the quality and price of their
goods, in the beauty and tastefulness of their enclosing packages, in the extent of their
advertising, and in the employment of agents, but they have no right, by imitative devices,
to beguile the public into buying their wares under the impression they are buying those of
their rivals.”); Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sand. Ch. 603, 617 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (“[Protection of
trademarks] does not at all trench upon the rights of others, by a course of conduct equally
deserving and praiseworthy, to enter the lists of competition, and bear off the palm.  But it
will not allow them by falsehood, fraud, and forgery, to filch from another his good name,
and share it in common with him, or destroy or impair it.”).
25 See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 513 (7th
Cir. 1912) (“The deception of the public naturally tends to injure the proprietor of a busi-
ness by diverting his customers and depriving him of sales which otherwise he might have
made.  This, rather than the protection of the public against imposition, is the sound and
true basis for the private remedy.”); see also Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 413–15 (“This essen-
tial element is the same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccompa-
nied with trade-mark infringement.”); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F.
299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding a “second comer” defendant liable where “the public will
believe his goods have come from the first [comer], and will buy, in part, at least, because
of that deception”); Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.
13,785) (“The case presented is one of unmitigated and designed infringement of the
rights of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of defrauding the public and taking from the plain-
tiffs the fair earnings of their skill, labor and enterprise.”); Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E.
1068, 1069 (Mass. 1890) (declaring that trademark law is intended “to prevent one man
from palming off his goods as another’s, from getting another’s business or injuring his
reputation by unfair means, and perhaps, from defrauding the public”); Coats v. Hol-
brook, Nelson & Co., 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 586, 594 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) (stating that a party is not
allowed to imitate the product of another and “thereby attract to himself the patronage
that without such deceptive use of such names . . . would have inured to the benefit of that
other person”).
26 Where the defendant was using a technical trademark, courts were confident that
the use had no legitimate explanation, so they were comfortable presuming that the defen-
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As a result, early trademark and unfair competition law reached only a
limited range of particularly egregious conduct—acts by direct competitors
(since only direct competitors could pass off goods as though they were the
plaintiff’s) that deceived consumers.  And precisely because of this restricted
scope, there were seldom cases where socially beneficial conduct ran the risk
of liability.  The modesty of the procompetitive norms embedded in tradi-
tional causes of action for trademark and unfair competition was generally
sufficient to avoid conflict with broader competition or speech values.
It should be no surprise, then, that there was little need for additional
defenses in the traditional era, aside from trans-substantive equitable
defenses like laches and acquiescence.27  When courts ruled for defendants
in cases that protected competition and speech values, they did so by enforc-
ing the inherent limits of trademark rights.  They might have invoked other
values such as competition when rejecting a plaintiff’s claim,28 but they did
so primarily to emphasize the reasons why trademark rights were so limited.
Take, for example, Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, which many regard as an early
application of the first sale doctrine.29  In that case Prestonettes purchased
genuine Coty toilet powder, “subject[ed it] to pressure, add[ed] a binder to
give it coherence and [sold] the compact in a metal case.”30  Prestonettes
also rebottled genuine Coty perfume in smaller containers.31  The district
court had issued, and Prestonettes agreed to abide by, a decree that allowed
Prestonettes
to put upon the rebottled perfume “Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with
Coty, states that the contents are Coty’s—(giving the name of the article)
independently rebottled in New York,” every word to be in letters of the
same size, color, type and general distinctiveness [and to] make compacts
from the genuine loose powder of the plaintiff and to sell them with this
label on the container: “Prestonettes, Inc., not connected with Coty, states
that the compact of face powder herein was independently compounded by
dant intended to deceive.  Where, on the other hand, a defendant’s conduct was ambigu-
ous—where, for example the defendant might have been using a term to denote the “class,
grade, style, or quality of the articles”—courts required the plaintiff to prove the defendant
intended to divert his trade. See, e.g., Diederich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor
Co., 195 F. 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1912); see also McKenna, supra note 5, at 1862 (describing the
difference between trademark infringement and unfair competition in terms of proof of
intent to deceive).
27 Even those doctrines were not complete defenses—they applied to preclude dam-
ages from past infringement, but not to bar injunctions against future infringement. See,
e.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877) (“Unreasonable delay in bringing a suit is
always a serious objection to relief in equity; but cases arise in litigations of the kind before
the court where the complainant may be entitled to an injunction to restrain the future use
of a trade-mark, even when it becomes the duty of the court to deny the prayer of the bill
of complaint for an account of past gains and profits.”).
28 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120–21 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
29 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
30 Id. at 366.
31 Id. at 367.
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it from Coty’s—(giving the name) loose powder and its own binder.  Loose
powder-percent, Binder-per cent,” every word to be in letters of the same
size, color, type, and general distinctiveness.32
But the Court of Appeals rejected that decree and “issued an absolute prelim-
inary injunction against the use of the [Coty] marks except on the original
packages as marked and sold by [Coty], thinking that the defendant could
not put upon the plaintiff the burden of keeping a constant watch.”33
The Supreme Court disagreed.  To begin with, the Court thought it obvi-
ous that Prestonettes
of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what
it bought, to divide either the original or the modified product, and to sell it
so divided.  The plaintiff could not prevent or complain of its stating the
nature of the component parts and the source from which they were derived
if it did not use the trade mark in doing so.34
Thus, the only question was whether Prestonettes’s use of Coty’s trademark
changed the result.  And the answer to that question was clear once the
Court focused on the limited nature of a trademark right:
Then what new rights does the trade mark confer?  It does not confer a right
to prohibit the use of the word or words.  It is not a copyright.  The argu-
ment drawn from the language of the Trade Mark Act does not seem to us to
need discussion. A trade mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as
to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his. . . .  When
the mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the
word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.  It is not taboo.35
Prestonettes v. Coty did not carve out any special new “first sale” exemption
from the scope of a trademark right.  It did not allow the defendant to
engage in conduct that caused the type of harm that was ordinarily actiona-
ble in order to vindicate some larger purpose of supporting competition.
Instead the Court simply held that trademark law was not concerned with any
use of a mark unless it deceived consumers into purchasing the defendant’s
product instead of the plaintiff’s.  Prestonettes’s use of the Coty mark with
the disclaimers described by the district court did not risk such passing off.
Therefore, it was not infringing.
If the name of Coty were allowed to be printed in different letters from the
rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual purchaser might
look no further and might be deceived.  But when it in no way stands out
from the statements of facts that unquestionably the defendant has a right to
communicate in some form, we see no reason why it should not be used
collaterally, not to indicate the goods, but to say that the trade-marked prod-
uct is a constituent in the article now offered as new and changed.  As a
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 368.
35 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 327
(1872)).
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general proposition there can be no doubt that the word might be so
used.36
Champion Spark Plug v. Sanders is similar, even though that case was
decided in 1947, when trademark law had already begun to expand beyond
its traditional limits.37  In that case, the district court found that the defend-
ants had infringed Champion’s trademark and engaged in unfair competi-
tion when they sold used Champion spark plugs without making clear that
those plugs were repaired and reconditioned.38  The district court therefore
enjoined the defendants
from offering or selling any of [Champion’s] plugs which had been repaired
or reconditioned unless (a) the trade mark and type and style marks were
removed, (b) the plugs were repainted with a durable grey, brown, orange,
or green paint, (c) the word “REPAIRED” was stamped into the plug in let-
ters of such size and depth as to retain enough white paint to display dis-
tinctly each letter of the word, (d) the cartons in which the plugs were
packed carried a legend indicating that they contained used spark plugs
originally made by [Champion] and repaired and made fit for use up to
10,000 miles by [defendants].39
The Second Circuit affirmed the findings of trademark infringement
and unfair competition, but it modified the injunction:
(a) it eliminated the provision requiring the trade mark and type and style
marks to be removed from the repaired or reconditioned plugs; (b) it substi-
tuted for the requirement that the word “REPAIRED” be stamped into the
plug, etc., a provision that the word “REPAIRED” or “USED” be stamped
and baked on the plug by an electrical hot press in a contrasting color so as
to be clearly and distinctly visible, the plug having been completely covered
by permanent aluminum paint or other paint or lacquer; and (c) it elimi-
36 Id. at 368–69.  Importantly, the Court noted that the case was only one of trademark
infringement and not unfair competition.
The question therefore [was] not how far the court would go in aid of a plaintiff
who showed ground for suspecting the defendant of making a dishonest use of
his opportunities, but [was] whether the plaintiff ha[d] the naked right alleged to
prohibit the defendant from making even a collateral reference to the plaintiff’s
mark.
Id. at 369.
37 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
38 Id. at 126 (“The outside box or carton in which the plugs are packed has stamped
on it the word ‘Champion,’ together with the letter and figure denoting the particular style
or type.  They also have printed on them ‘Perfect Process Spark Plugs Guaranteed Depend-
able’ and ‘Perfect Process Renewed Spark Plugs.’  Each carton contains smaller boxes in
which the plugs are individually packed.  These inside boxes also carry legends indicating
that the plug has been renewed.  But respondent company’s business name or address is
not printed on the cartons.  It supplies customers with petitioner’s charts containing rec-
ommendations for the use of Champion plugs.  On each individual plug is stamped in
small letters, blue on black, the word ‘Renewed,’ which at times is almost illegible.” (foot-
note omitted)).
39 Id. at 126–27.
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nated the provision specifying the precise legend to be printed on the car-
tons and substituted therefor a more general one.40
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Champion argued that the Second
Circuit had erred by allowing the defendant to keep the word “Champion”
on the repaired or reconditioned spark plugs.41  The Supreme Court
rejected Champion’s argument, implicitly holding that a party which ade-
quately discloses the repaired or reconditioned status of authentic second-
hand goods may use the original trademark to re-sell those goods.42  Just as
in Prestonettes, on which it relied extensively, the Court made clear that the
defendant’s use of the Champion mark with full disclosure of the goods’
reconditioned status simply fell outside the limited scope of Champion’s
trademark rights.43  The Court “put to one side the case of a manufacturer or
distributor who markets new or used spark plugs of one make under the
trade mark of another,”44 and it limited relief to disclosure of the defen-
dant’s repairing or reconditioning of the spark plugs because there had been
“no showing of fraud or palming off.”45
As this discussion illustrates, the outcomes in both Prestonettes and Cham-
pion depended entirely on the limited nature of trademark rights.  In both
cases, the Court found the defendant’s conduct non-infringing because it was
not the type of conduct that caused the specific harm trademark and unfair
competition law addressed.46  Neither decision relied on special excuses or
exemptions or other limiting doctrines distinct from the prima facie case.
And this approach was typical during that era—outside of standard equitable
40 Id. at 127–28.
41 Id. at 128.
42 Id. at 130.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 128.
45 Id. at 130.  There was fault, of course, in the defendant’s original packaging, which
the Court believed fell within the reach of trademark and unfair competition law because
it did not adequately disclose that the spark plugs were used and were coming from a
company other than Champion. Id.
46 We can see in Champion some evidence of the broadening of trademark law’s reach
that was already afoot.  In the process of rejecting Champion’s claim, the Court acknowl-
edged that under Prestonettes, a second-hand dealer would get “some advantage from the
trade mark.” Id.  But, the Court said, such an advantage was “wholly permissible so long as
the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from
wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer.” Id.  In Prestonettes the Court found that
advantage permissible so long as it was not gained by deceiving consumers into believing
that the used goods were the original goods.  Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369
(1924).  The Champion Court’s slightly broadened view reflects courts’ increasing accept-
ance of a broader range of harms in trademark cases, and particularly their concern about
the risk that the mark owner would be blamed for the low quality of goods bearing its
mark. See Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 63, 86–90 (2009).  We have more to say about this broadening, and its relation to
limiting doctrines, below. See infra Section I.B.
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doctrines, there really were no defenses in trademark law.47  Certainly there
were no analogues in these cases to modern doctrines like nominative fair
use or any First Amendment defense.
Nor were any other limiting doctrines needed.  When it reached such a
narrow range of conduct, there was little chance of trademark law conflicting
seriously with other values.  Each of our three fact patterns illustrates these
inherent limits of earlier trademark rights.  Competitors, resellers, and other
third parties could promote their own goods and services using trademarks as
long as they avoided passing off, as demonstrated in Prestonettes and Cham-
pion.  And it would have been unimaginable in the early 1900s for a court to
entertain a trademark claim against an artist who depicted a label in her
painting or the producer of a motion picture that mentioned a brand name.
Neither of those uses threatens trade diversion.
As for product design, there was little need for a functionality doctrine
because most courts categorically rejected unfair competition claims based
on allegations that the defendant copied the design of a product, reasoning
that unpatented designs were free for copying.48  Even though those cases
involved directly competing goods, courts could prevent trade diversion—the
only harm with which they were concerned—by requiring clear labeling.49
47 There were defenses in the formal sense because of the burden-shifting effect of
federal registration.  But these were not limiting doctrines that excused otherwise infring-
ing behavior, distinct from the prima facie case. See William McGeveran, The Trademark
Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2291–98 (2010).
48 See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 183, 185 (1896) (allowing
the defendant to produce sewing machines with similar designs to the plaintiff’s because
the protecting patent had expired, even though consumers had come to associate the
design with the plaintiff’s company); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F.
299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (expressly allowing the defendant to “copy the plaintiff’s [adjusta-
ble wrench] slavishly down to the minutest detail,” as no one was entitled to “monopolize
any [unpatented] design or pattern, however trifling”); Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 59 N.E.
667, 667 (Mass. 1901) (“[T]he defendant ha[d] the same right that the plaintiff ha[d] to
manufacture instruments in the present form, to imitate the arrangement of the plaintiff’s
strings or the shape of the body.  In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufacture
cannot be cut down under the name of preventing unfair competition.  All that can be
asked is that precautions shall be taken, so far as are consistent with the defendant’s funda-
mental right to make and sell what it chooses, to prevent the deception which no doubt it
desires to practice.” (citations omitted)).
49 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120–21 (1938) (noting that
there was no evidence the defendant had attempted to pass off its product, as “[t]he Kel-
logg cartons [were] distinctive.  They d[id] not resemble those used by the plaintiff either
in size, form, or color.  And the difference in the labels [was] striking.  The Kellogg cartons
[bore] in bold script the names ‘Kellogg’s Whole Wheat Biscuit’ or ‘Kellogg’s Shredded
Whole Wheat Biscuit’ so sized and spaced as to strike the eye as being a Kellogg product”
and also noting that, despite Kellogg’s use of a “picture of two shredded wheat biscuits in a
bowl of milk which was quite similar to one of the plaintiff’s registered trademarks . . . the
name Kellogg was so prominent on all of the defendant’s cartons as to minimize the possi-
bility of confusion”); Singer, 163 U.S. at 204 (enjoining the defendant “from using the word
‘Singer’ or any equivalent thereto . . . without clearly and unmistakably stating in all said
advertisements that the machines are made by the defendant, as distinguished from the
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While there were some outlying cases,50 they were sufficiently rare that the
functionality doctrine (which derived from the distinctions in these cases)
only developed significantly later as trade dress gained greater trademark
protection.51  Early product design cases therefore reflect the general theme
we have described: because trademark law conceived of its ends narrowly and
reached a limited range of conduct, there was no real need for a special
limiting doctrine to deal with mechanically functional features.  Courts could
simply observe the inherent limits of trademark rights to avoid conflict with
the patent system and its competition norms.
sewing machines made by the Singer Manufacturing Company”); Flagg Mfg., 59 N.E. at 667
(“[T]he plaintiff’s right can be protected sufficiently by requiring the defendant’s zithers
to be clearly marked so as to indicate unmistakably that they are the defendant’s and not
the plaintiff’s goods.”); see also Crescent Tool, 247 F. at 301 (“The defendant . . . may copy
the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself
as the plaintiff in their sale.”).  At times, Judge Hand, who authored the opinion in Crescent
Tool, also seemed to suggest even the limited remedy of labeling would only be required
with respect to nonfunctional features by which the article’s source is distinguished, and
where “the public is moved in any degree to buy the [plaintiff’s] article because of its
source.” Id. at 300.
50 See George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 85 N.E. 417, 418 (Mass. 1908) (enjoining the
defendants’ manufacturing and sale of bread loaves that mirrored the plaintiff’s in size,
shape, color, and general visual appearance despite the fact that the defendant sold its
loaves under a different name and packaged its loaves in a broad paper band that was
marked “Hathaway’s Log Cabin Bread. Finest Flavor, Malted” in contrast to the plaintiff’s
small paper label containing the words “Fox’s Creamalt”); see also id. (rejecting the suffi-
ciency of labeling because “[t]here was nothing to show that the defendants’ business
interests required the combination of this shape with the same size, color and general
visual appearance” as the plaintiff’s loaves and noting that there were “numberless shapes
and sizes in which loaves of bread may be produced, and various peculiarities of appear-
ance in color and condition of surface”).
51 Courts also often discussed refusals to register product design features in functional-
ity terms. See, e.g., In re Oneida Cmty., 41 App. D.C. 260, 260–61, 1913 WL 19946 (D.C. Cir.
1913) (affirming the Trademark Office’s refusal to register “a circular or O-shaped film
having distinct edges, on the back of the spoon bowl” on the ground it was an “attempt,
under the guise of trademark registration, to obtain a monopoly of a functional feature of
an article of manufacture” when “clearly no functional feature of a device is a proper sub-
ject for trademark registration” (citation omitted)).  Professor McCarthy suggests that
these earlier decisions are precursors to modern functionality doctrine. See 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 21, § 7:63.  But these registration decisions do not use “functionality” in a mod-
ern sense—they use that term merely to make clear that features of products themselves
were not proper subject matter of trademark law: “functional” meant “part of the product.”
See, e.g., Herz v. Loewenstein, 40 App. D.C. 277, 278, 1913 WL 19916 (D.C. Cir. 1913)
(cancelling registration of a mark produced by a “process of sealing the packages [that]
produces a corrugated embossing on the ends of the wrappers, which constitutes the trade-
mark” on the ground that the “mark [was] not placed upon the toothpicks, but [was]
produced as the result of a distinct method of sealing the wrappers” and as “part of the
manufactured wrappers, [was] not subject to registration as an arbitrary mark”).  Moreo-
ver, those cases only dealt with registrability; they did not deal with protection via unfair
competition claims for unregistered trade dress.
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This model only worked when trademark rights remained narrow.  But
as the next Section explains, the subsequent massive expansion of trademark
rights disrupted courts’ ability to rely on inherent limits in the prima facie
case.
B. The Emergence of the Confusion Rationale
Beginning around 1920, courts began to see traditional trademark law’s
focus on trade diversion as overly constrained.  The increasing complexity of
manufacturing and marketing practices exerted increasing pressure through-
out the twentieth century to broaden the scope of trademark rights.  Courts
responded to this pressure by recognizing a much wider range of uses of a
mark as potentially infringing and accepting a wider range of designations as
protectable subject matter.
First, courts began to find infringement when use of a mark caused con-
sumers to think either (1) that the plaintiff actually produced the defendant’s
goods or (2) that the plaintiff sponsored the defendant’s goods or was affili-
ated with their producer.  In Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., for example,
the court held that the defendant’s use of “The Vogue Hat Company” to sell
hats infringed the plaintiff’s rights in the VOGUE mark for magazines.52
Even if consumers would not believe the hat company was the magazine pub-
lisher, it was enough if they might incorrectly believe there was a relationship
between the two.53  We mean to emphasize two aspects of this expansion.
First, and most obviously, courts extended trademark infringement beyond
the context of directly competing goods, deemphasizing trade diversion as
unfair competition’s defining harm.  Second, courts elevated consumer con-
fusion, making it, rather than deception, the central inquiry.54  Together
52 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924).
53 Id.
54 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts regularly denied relief
in cases in which they acknowledged that consumers were likely to be confused.  In Canal
Co. v. Clark, for example, the Supreme Court refused to prevent the defendant from truth-
fully describing his coal as having originated from “Lackawanna” despite the plaintiff’s
prior use of that geographically descriptive term.  80 U.S. 311, 324 (1872).  It did so even
though it recognized there was a risk of consumer confusion, because confusion was not
enough. Id. at 327 (“[I]f it is just as true in its application to his goods as it is to those of
another who first applied it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to use it, there is
no legal or moral wrong done.  Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by
false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.”). American Wash-
board Co. v. Saginaw Manufacturing Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), is also illustrative here.
In that case, the plaintiff manufactured washboards with aluminum coated facings and sold
the washboards under the “aluminum” trade name. Id. at 282.  The defendant also desig-
nated its washboards as “aluminum,” even though it actually made its products out of zinc.
Id. at 283.  While there was little dispute that the defendant had in fact misrepresented the
nature of its goods, the court denied injunctive relief. Id. at 281.  Since “aluminum” was
merely the descriptive title of a kind of washboard, no single producer could claim the
term as its own. Id. at 282.  Without additional acts beyond use of the “aluminum” trade
name, the plaintiff could not claim that the defendant was “palming off” its goods as those
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these conceptual moves set the stage for tremendous expansion.  Courts
would come to accept claims based on consumer confusion about a wider
range of relationships between the plaintiff and defendant, most of which are
now collected under the heading of “sponsorship or affiliation” confusion.55
And they would detach confusion from the point of sale by recognizing ini-
tial-interest56 and post-sale confusion.57
At the same time, courts dramatically expanded the range of designators
potentially subject to trademark protection.  Of particular significance here,
courts began recognizing and more aggressively protecting trade dress, of
both the packaging and product design varieties.  The critical development
took root in the 1970s as more courts interpreted § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
to provide a cause of action for unregistered trademarks.58  Most trade dress
is not federally registered (and this was even more certainly true in the early
to mid-twentieth century), and the Supreme Court had made clear in its Sears
and Compco decisions that federal law preempted any state unfair competi-
of the plaintiff. Id. at 284.  At most, the defendant was misrepresenting the nature of its
goods.  The court noted that the plaintiff had “los[t] sight of the thoroughly established
principle that the private right of action in [these] cases is not based upon fraud or imposi-
tion upon the public, but is maintained solely for the protection of the property rights of a
complainant.” Id. at 285.
55 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 1, at 423–27.  For a discussion of the appropriate
limits of sponsorship and affiliation confusion, see id. at 447–50 (arguing that courts have
extended confusion beyond the point where consumers are harmed and arguing for a
showing of harm and materiality in sponsorship and affiliation cases).
56 Some courts recently have begun to express skepticism about broad application of
the initial interest confusion doctrine.  See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722
F.3d 1229, 1243–45 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the continued existence of the initial-
interest confusion theory in the Tenth Circuit but rejecting it in a standard keyword adver-
tising case); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316–18 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
Fourth Circuit had never explicitly accepted the initial-interest confusion doctrine and
refusing to apply it where the defendant’s website made clear that the site was not spon-
sored by the plaintiff and the defendant did not use the domain name to derive financial
benefit).  Nevertheless, it remains a viable theory of infringement in most circuits. See, e.g.,
McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners, L.L.C., 511 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir.
2007); Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238–39 (10th Cir. 2006); Check-
point Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., 269 F.3d 270, 294 (3d Cir. 2001); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Natural Answers Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000); Interstellar Starship Servs.,
Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,
155 F.3d 526, 543–45 (5th Cir. 1998).
57 Herme`s Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000);
Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Krueger Int’l. Inc.
v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Can-
ner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492–93 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
58 This trend depended ultimately on expansion of the concept of “origin” beyond
geographic origin to include the trademark concept of source.  Professor McCarthy attrib-
utes that expansion to the decision in Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313
F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963). See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 27:7.
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tion law that barred copying unpatented designs.59  Since post-Erie unfair
competition claims arose under state law,60 courts could not find their way
around Sears and Compco until they conceived of trade dress infringement as
a federal statutory claim.  But once they accepted that interpretation of the
Lanham Act, whatever conceptual force Sears and Compco had in limiting the
subject matter of trademark law began to erode.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc. in 1992, it assumed that trade dress cases should be handled just like any
other trademark case, and there was “no persuasive reason to apply different
analysis” with respect to distinctiveness.61  The Court went further in Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., endorsing trademark protection for “almost any-
thing at all that is capable of carrying meaning.”62  Having accepted this
broad view of trademark subject matter, in its most recent cases the Supreme
Court has felt the need to scale back—by requiring evidence of secondary
meaning for certain types of indicators,63 by strengthening the functionality
doctrine,64 and by construing § 43(a) more narrowly.65  Relying in part on
some older cases such as Canal v. Clark, the Court also has cautioned that
limiting doctrines such as the descriptive fair use provision in § 33(b)(4) of
the Lanham Act may apply even in the face of some lingering confusion.66
But these retrenchments only became necessary after the Supreme Court
endorsed a capacious view of trademark subject matter that opened up new
fronts in trademark litigation.67
59 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
60 See Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942) (“The only
cause of action that [the] record could possibly support is for unfair competition and
common law ‘trademark infringement,’ to which local law applies.”).
61 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992).  The Court held in Two Pesos that inherently distinctive
and non-functional trade dress was protectable without evidence of secondary meaning.
Id. at 776.
62 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
63 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (requiring secon-
dary meaning for product design, as opposed to product packaging); see also Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 163 (requiring secondary meaning for color standing alone).
64 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (holding that a
feature is functional if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects
the cost or quality of the device”). TrafFix Devices also held that the question of whether
“exclusive use . . . would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvan-
tage” is relevant in cases of aesthetic functionality, and that available alternative designs are
not relevant once the court has determined the feature is functional because it is essential
to the use or purpose or affects the cost or quality. Id. (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165).
65 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (inter-
preting “origin of goods” in § 43(a) to refer only to the origin of physical goods, and not
the origin of creative content).
66 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004)
(“[S]ome possibility of consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use . . . .”) (ana-
lyzing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
67 In TrafFix the Court said:
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To be absolutely clear: we are not arguing here that all of trademark
law’s expansion was illegitimate.  We highlight this trajectory simply to under-
score one significant consequence of that growth: trademark rights today
threaten values of competition and communication more frequently and
more seriously.  When trademark law had a more limited domain, there was
little need for particular limiting doctrines.  Courts could prevent conflict
with competition and communication values simply by observing the inher-
ent limits of trademark rights.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, courts had essen-
tially inverted the analysis in trademark cases by elevating confusion itself to
central status and paying less attention to the particular harms or benefits
stemming from a defendant’s unlicensed use of a trademark.  The resulting
expansions of the scope of infringement and trademark subject matter made
it impossible to depend on any inherent limits of trademark rights to prevent
clashes with other important values.
Why did courts gravitate toward viewing the elimination of consumer
confusion as the animating purpose of trademark law?  It would be impossi-
ble to say for certain, but we think a few factors likely contributed to the shift.
One is the key role that the concept of consumer confusion played in mid-
twentieth-century debates about the danger that expanding trademark rights
would create barriers to market entry.68  Proponents of expanded trademark
rights assured their anti-monopoly critics that reliance on confusion as a
requirement for liability would prevent anticompetitive outcomes.69  Ironi-
It is well established that trade dress can be protected under federal law.  The
design or packaging of a product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to
identify the product with its manufacturer or source; and a design or package
which acquires this secondary meaning, assuming other requisites are met, is a
trade dress which may not be used in a manner likely to cause confusion as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods.
532 U.S. at 28.  By contrast, in Compco, the Court rejected a claim “based wholly on the fact
that selling an article which is an exact copy of another unpatented article is likely to
produce and did in this case produce confusion as to the source of the article” on the
grounds that unpatented designs must remain in the public domain, free for all to copy
(subject to appropriate labeling).  Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
237 (1964).  Having converted these unfair competition claims into federal claims under
the Lanham Act, lower courts had eviscerated previous limits, and the Supreme Court
followed suit.
68 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of com-
petition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other.”).  The work of economist Edward Chamberlin
animated much of the anti-monopoly sentiment. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 367–69 (1999) (describing the reemergence of the “trade-
marks as monopoly” argument and attributing it in large part to Chamberlin and his 1933
work The Theory of Monopolistic Competition).  Chamberlin’s cause was advanced in the legal
literature most notably by Ralph Brown. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170–71 (1948).
69 See, e.g., Beverly W. Pattishall, Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV.
965, 979 (1952) (“The mark, whatever it may be, is unimportant.  It is only a means to an
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cally, as we show below, we think confusion reasoning has had exactly the
opposite effect in a range of situations, facilitating just the sorts of monopo-
listic forces those critics feared.
We also suspect the focus on confusion was attractive because it allowed
courts, legislators, and advocates to avoid fully reconceptualizing trademark
law after the collapse of consensus around trade diversion.  Different
accounts of trademark law’s purposes converge on the undesirability of con-
sumer confusion, even if they do not agree on much else.  An emphasis on
confusion allowed the recasting of trademark law as a form of protection for
consumers rather than for producers.70  Many courts also focused on poten-
tial harms to markholders from broadly-defined confusion,71 particularly (1)
reputational consequences resulting from consumers’ association of the new
uses with the senior user;72 (2) the risk that junior users would foreclose
geographic or product markets to which the senior user had a superior
right;73 and (3) the junior user’s free-riding on the value of the senior user’s
reputation.74
end, the end being the worthy one of identification for the public of merchandise or ser-
vice with source and thus connecting and preserving good will to its rightful owner.”).
70 By the middle part of the twentieth century, some courts would claim that consumer
protection, not producer interests, always had been the purpose of unfair competition law.
See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 570–71 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“Distaste for sharp or unethical business practices has often caused the courts to lose sight
of the fundamental consideration in the law of unfair competition—protection of the pub-
lic.”).  For an account of this recasting of trademark law in consumer protection terms, see
McKenna, supra note 5.
71 For thorough criticisms of these justifications for broader trademark protection, see
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 20, criticizing market pre-emption and free-riding argu-
ments, and McKenna, supra note 46, criticizing claims of reputational harm in many non-
competing goods cases.
72 See, e.g., James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976) (“[T]he owner of a mark is damaged by a later use of a similar mark which places
the owner’s reputation beyond its control, though no loss in business is shown.”); Aunt
Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917) (“Syrup and flour are
both food products, and food products commonly used together.  Obviously the public, or
a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would conclude that it was made by the
complainant.  Perhaps they might not do so, if it were used for flatirons.  In this way the
complainant’s reputation is put in the hands of the defendants.” (emphasis added)); see also Yale
Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (“[A producer’s] mark is his
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or
ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own
control.  This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales
by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and
another can use it only as a mask.” (emphasis added)).
73 See, e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps. Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1174–75 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that the defendant’s use of VERA for cosmetics and toiletries infringed the
plaintiff’s rights in the same mark for women’s scarves, sportswear, and linens).
74 See, e.g., Stork Rest., Inc., v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356 (9th Cir. 1948) (“The value of
the designation is wholly adventitious, brought about by continued, expensive, and spec-
tacular advertising—such as the giving away of one thousand dollar bills.  The conclusion
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Most important of all, prevention of confusion is the linchpin of the
search costs theory,75 which for the last several decades has been the domi-
nant theoretical account of trademark law among courts76 and commenta-
tors77 alike.  According to that theory, trademark law enables consumers to
rely on trademarks as shorthands for information about the source and qual-
ity of the products with which they are used.  By preventing conflicting uses
of a mark, trademark law guarantees the reliability of these signals and
enables consumers to avoid costly search processes.78  It’s not that producers
is inescapable that the appellees are seeking to capitalize on the publicity that the appel-
lant has built around the name.”); Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 410 (worrying that
consumer confusion would not only put the markholder’s reputation in the hands of the
defendant, but that the defendant would “get the benefit of the complainant’s reputation
and advertisement”).
75 For the most famous articulation of the search costs theory, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–69
(1987).
76 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (“[B]y
preventing competitors from copying a ‘source-identifying mark,’ [trademark law]
‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ and ‘helps
assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputa-
tion-related rewards associated with a desirable product[.]’” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995))); see also Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 215–16 (2d Cir.
2012) (acknowledging Qualitex for its support of search costs theory); Union Nat’l Bank,
Laredo v. Union Nat’l Bank, Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The idea is that
trademarks are ‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and encourage
higher quality production by discouraging free-riders.”); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Trademarks help consumers to select goods.  By
identifying the source of the goods, they convey valuable information to consumers at
lower costs.  Easily identified trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in searching for
what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the market.”).
77 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines
in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223–24 (2007) (noting that commentators
and courts generally endorse the search costs theory and arguing that the theory also limits
trademark rights in underappreciated ways); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trade-
marks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs] (arguing that the historical normative goal of
trademark law is to foster the flow of information in markets, thereby reducing search costs
for consumers); Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer
Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 97–99 (2004) (arguing
that courts should find initial interest confusion actionable only when the use causes more
confusion than it creates benefit to consumers in the form of better information); Clarisa
Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033–34 (2006) (contrasting dilution protection
with traditional trademark protection and arguing that the former is producer-centered
while the latter is consumer-centered); Lunney, supra note 68, at 432 (“Trademarks can,
therefore, help ensure that the pricing signals received by producers from the market (or
‘expressed demand’) more accurately reflect consumers’ actual tastes and preferences (or
‘actual demand’).”).
78 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003):
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are absent from the search costs theory, but their interests matter only inso-
far as they can be harnessed for consumers’ benefit.79
There are, of course, other theoretical accounts of trademark law—Jer-
emy Sheff’s contractarian theory of trademark law,80 theories about the per-
sonal value of prestige goods,81 and a theory focused on consumer decision-
making that one of us has proposed,82 to name three recent examples.  Nev-
ertheless, it would be nearly impossible to overstate the extent to which the
search costs theory now dominates as the theoretical justification of trade-
mark law.  The overwhelming majority of scholars use search cost language to
describe trademark law’s purposes.83  The Supreme Court has explicitly
endorsed the search costs theory as trademark law’s core theoretical justifica-
tion,84 and lower courts do so routinely as well.85
What nearly all of these theories of trademark law have in common is an
initial focus on consumer confusion as the predicate for some ultimate harm,
Suppose, then, that a consumer has a favorable experience with brand X and
wants to buy it again.  Or suppose he wants to buy brand X because it has been
recommended by a reliable source or because he has had a favorable experience
with another brand produced by the same producer.  Rather than reading the
fine print on the package to determine whether the description matches his
understanding of brand X, or investigating the attributes of all the different ver-
sions of the product (of which X is one brand) to determine which one is brand
X, the consumer will find it much less costly to search by identifying the relevant
trademark and purchasing the corresponding brand. . . .  A trademark conveys
information that allows the consumer to say to himself, “I need not investigate the
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a short-
hand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I
enjoyed earlier.”
79 Trademark law protects mark owners’ investments in goodwill, for example, but it
does so only because giving mark owners the ability to reap the benefits of goodwill
encourages them to invest in product quality. See id. at 166–68; Eric Goldman, Deregulating
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 552 (2005) (describing trademark
law’s purposes as “protecting consumers from confusion” and “protecting producers’
investments in quality that creates consumer goodwill towards them”).
80 Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 763–64 (2013).
81 See Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 987 (2012);
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,”
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 622–23 (2007) (“Specifically, three inseparable demands
reside within a branded product.  The first is a demand for the product itself: the physical
and functional attributes of a suit, a perfume, a salad dressing. . . .  The second kind of
demand is for intra-brand information about the product’s credence qualities. . . .  The
third demand is for the image or psychological pleasure associated with the mark’s
fame. . . .  Put differently, the trademark does not act to increase sales only by economizing
on consumers’ search costs or by minimizing consumers’ error costs.” (footnotes
omitted)).
82 Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L.
REV. 67, 72 (2012).
83 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 78, at 166–209 (summarizing the consumer
search costs literature).
84 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).
85 See supra note 76 (listing cases).
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whether to consumers, producers, or both.86  It seems likely to us that courts
were attracted to confusion as the primary value in trademark law precisely
for this reason: they might have believed they could resolve (or at least elide)
debates about the deeper purposes of trademark by focusing on prevention
of consumer confusion as a mid-level principle.87  If all the varied harms flow
from confusion, courts could simply focus on eliminating confusion and, at
least superficially, satisfy everyone.  Unfortunately, as the next Part describes,
overemphasizing confusion only sweeps the theoretical discord under the
rug, and it actually hides normative principles that could help guide courts to
better results, particularly in certain recurring situations where confusion
reasoning conflicts with broader competition or communication policies.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?
Of course, nobody likes confusion.  A glance at its definitions brings up
words such as ruin, discomfiture, shame, and tumult.88  Yet notwithstanding
these undesirable connotations, confusion by itself rarely justifies legal inter-
vention.  A variety of legal rules acknowledge, and even embrace, the possibil-
ity that people may be confused about very important things.  Even in
elections, provably untrue assertions sometimes must be tolerated.89  Foun-
dational doctrines, notably the “actual malice” standard from New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, allow misleading and even calumnious claims about the most
important topics of speech.90  When embracing this standard, the Supreme
Court famously warned that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate” and “must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”91
86 McKenna’s consumer decision-making theory is somewhat of an outlier here in that
his theory focuses on deception rather than confusion.  McKenna, supra note 82, at 113
(“Trademark law should attempt to regulate only uses of a mark that interfere with con-
sumers’ ability to effectuate their decisions by deceiving them.”).  Nevertheless, McKenna
sees deception as a predicate to the ultimate harm of interfering with consumer decision-
making.  Id.
87 Cf. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011) (proposing a the-
ory of intellectual property that identifies philosophical “foundations” which might reflect
only overlapping consensus and “midlevel principles” which unify divergent foundations in
the operation of legal rules).
88 See Confusion Definition, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.
com/index.php?term=confusion (last visited Oct.16, 2013).  The word’s etymology traces
back through the word “confound” to the Latin word confundere, meaning to pour or min-
gle things together or mix them up. Id.
89 For a thoughtful discussion about the difficulties of regulating even outright false-
hoods in political campaigns, see Jacob Rowbottom, Lies, Manipulation, and Elections—Con-
trolling False Campaign Statements, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 507 (2012).
90 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring heightened standard
for proof of defamation involving public officials); see also, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 387–88 (1967) (expanding principle to “matters of public interest” in the context of
false light tort claims).
91 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
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This tolerance of confusion extends past highly protected political dis-
course.  Liability in garden-variety cases of defamation and fraud generally
requires proof that the defendant made a demonstrably false statement, not
merely one that caused confusion among some people who heard it.92  False
advertising claims likewise demand proof of falsehood.93  The Supreme
Court recently struck down a ban on outright lies about a person’s receipt of
the Medal of Honor, largely because the prohibition was not limited to situa-
tions where the falsehood resulted in concrete harm such as fraud or unjust
enrichment.94  Even the Food and Drug Administration, which closely regu-
lates exactly what purveyors of pharmaceuticals may say about their drugs,
does not intervene to prevent doctors or others from making different claims
about them, or from proposing and authorizing off-label uses.95
In some of these examples, the law declines to intervene to protect
against potential confusion because the confusion that might arise would not
cause the kinds of harm with which these legal protections are fundamentally
concerned.  Defamation law, for example, protects the plaintiff’s reputation,
not the general public’s understanding of the truth.  False advertising seeks
to harness the market benefits of consumer decisions based on accurate
92 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 558 (1977).
93 See United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that “a party seeking relief . . . bears the ultimate burden of proving actual deception by
using reliable consumer or market research”); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co.,
108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that to prove falsity “a plaintiff may show that
the statement was literally false, either on its face or by necessary implication, or that the
statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse consumers”); Johnson & John-
son * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d
Cir. 1992) (stating that to recover, plaintiffs must prove either that “the challenged adver-
tisement is literally false” or that “while the advertisement is literally true it is nevertheless
likely to mislead or confuse consumers”); Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B:
Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (2011) (“False
statements violate the Lanham Act without further proof of consumer deception . . . .
Literally true statements must be shown to mislead consumers with extrinsic evidence.”).
94 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–48 (2012).  The majority opinion
obliquely distinguished trademark law by characterizing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Committee, 488 U.S. 522 (1987), as a case where intervention was
justified because “the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.” See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
at 2547.  In a concurrence, Justice Breyer tackled trademark law more explicitly.  While we
would argue that his recital of the standard shorthand formulation too readily accepted
that confusion “tends” to cause significant harm almost automatically, he strongly empha-
sized that trademark law aims at the resulting harm and not simply at confusion itself. Id.
at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]rademark statutes are focused upon commercial and
promotional activities that are likely to dilute the value of a mark.  Indeed, they typically
require a showing of likely confusion, a showing that tends to assure that the feared harm will in
fact take place.” (emphasis added)).
95 See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“[N]either Congress nor the FDA has attempted to regulate the off-label use of drugs by
doctors and consumers.  A physician may prescribe a legal drug to serve any purpose that
he or she deems appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved for that
use by the FDA.”).
276 notre dame law review [vol. 89:1
information, not to prevent individual consumers’ mistakes or reduce their
cognitive effort.  In these areas, as in trademark law, the confused audience
does not even have standing to bring a claim.96  In other cases the law
declines to intervene, notwithstanding potential harm, because preventing
that harm would come at the expense of important broader values such as
free and fair competition or “breathing space” for open and accurate
communication.97
Trademark law is (or at least ought to be) no different.  Confusion is not
relevant to trademark law simply in order to be kind to addle-brained con-
sumers.  Rather, avoiding certain kinds of confusion prevents erroneous deci-
sions, maintains incentives for producers to provide consistent products,
promotes market competition, and the like.98  Of course, consumers ulti-
mately benefit from better information and competition—but less directly
96 See, e.g., PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“What matters [for standing] is whether a commercial party has a ‘reasonable interest to
be protected’ against the alleged advertising.”); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v.
Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that “[s]uit may be
brought only by a commercial plaintiff who can prove that its interests have been harmed
by a competitor’s false advertising” (citing Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson–Vicks, Inc.,
902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990))); EventMedia Int’l, Inc. v. Time Inc. Mag. Co., No. 92 Civ.
0502 (JFK), 1992 WL 321629, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1992) (“The allegations . . . do not
constitute commercial speech by a competitor for the purpose of influencing consumers to
buy the competitor’s services.  Hence, [p]laintiffs have failed to state a claim . . . .”).
97 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (“[E]rroneous state-
ment is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’” (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))); Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d
387, 391, 393–94 (8th Cir. 2004) (defining puffery broadly in order to give “advertisers and
manufacturers considerable leeway to craft their statements, . . . ensuring vigorous compe-
tition, and protecting legitimate commercial speech” and downplaying survey results show-
ing confusion because “[t]o allow a consumer survey to determine a claim’s benchmark
would” lead to “unpredictability [and] could chill commercial speech”).
98 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)
(“[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or dis-
liked) in the past.  At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a
desirable product.” (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01(2) (3d ed. 1994))); Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Trademarks help consumers to
select goods.  By identifying the source of the goods, they convey valuable information to
consumers at lower costs.  Easily identified trademarks reduce the costs consumers incur in
searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the
market.”); Lunney, supra note 68, at 432 (“Trademarks can, therefore, help ensure that the
pricing signals received by producers from the market (or ‘expressed demand’) more
accurately reflect consumers’ actual tastes and preferences (or ‘actual demand’).”); I.P.L.
Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J.L. & ECON. 207,
208–11 (1995) (presenting empirical evidence in support of the search costs rationale).
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than is suggested when oversimplified linear reasoning targets confusion as
the core problem.  Likelihood of consumer confusion is supposed to be a
heuristic that indicates the probability of subsequent harm to the consumer
and the market.  Like defamation, false advertising, or pharmaceutical regu-
lation, trademark law serves a different and deeper purpose than merely
policing accuracy.  Trademark law therefore ought to ignore confusion
unless it implicates those deeper purposes.  Further, even when consumer
confusion does cause relevant injury, intervening to prevent it may do more
harm than good for the broader policy interests in fair competition or open
communication that caused us to care about confusion in the first place.  By
placing confusion at the conceptual core of trademark law, courts glossed
over the law’s deeper purposes and the tradeoffs entailed in enforcing rights
in particular settings.  The cost has become quite clear over the last several
decades as courts in a variety of contexts have recognized that trademark
rights were bumping up against competition and communication values and
have attempted to fashion new rules to protect those values.  Courts have, for
example, shown concern about the competitive consequences of protecting
trade dress, particularly product configuration; they have attempted to carve
out space for comparative advertising; they have been solicitous of private
label goods that mimic the appearance of their brand name competitors;
they have appreciated the value of using a trademark in connection with the
unlicensed re-sale of branded goods; and they have seen the need for special
rules when trademark owners complain about uses of their marks within
expressive works like movies and songs.
Yet we think these new limiting doctrines have largely failed.  With the
exception of mechanical functionality, all of these doctrines were modeled
on old approaches like those in Prestonettes and Champion that depended on a
narrow scope for underlying trademark rights.  As a result, they continue to
depend ultimately on the absence of confusion rather than the presence of
other benefits.  They are not true defenses because they effectively require a
shortcoming in the prima facie case.  All of these doctrines therefore share
two flaws: they submerge the non-confusion values rhetorically and concep-
tually and they impose significant administrative costs and delay on unli-
censed users of trademarks.  We will return here to our three illustrative fact
patterns (product designs, third-party promotions, and uses in expressive
works) to describe in more detail how broad confusion reasoning clashes
with significant values, and how courts’ attempts to manage those conflicts
fall short.  This will set the stage for our discussion of a preferable approach
in Part III.
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A. Recurring Conflicts
1. Product Features
As noted above, it took a long time for courts to recognize features of a
product’s design as trademark subject matter.99  This delay stemmed in part
from two concerns about trade dress protection.  First, product features often
affect the performance of a product, and those features are therefore poten-
tially the subject of utility patent.  Thus, allowing trademark protection of
those features may undermine the integrity of the patent system and its
embedded competition norms.  Second, even when no patents cover a prod-
uct feature, blocking potential rivals from using that feature can have particu-
lar negative effects on competition.
Current Supreme Court precedent addresses these concerns in two ways.
First, product design, unlike product packaging, can never be considered
inherently distinctive and is only protectable when the claimant can prove
that design features have acquired source significance.100  Second, there is
no protection for functional product features, which the Court has defined
as those that are “‘essential to the use or purpose of the article,’ or [that]
‘affect[ ] the cost or quality.’”101
When the product features in question are mechanically useful, func-
tionality doctrine gives great weight to concerns about the effect on competi-
tion values.  The strength of this doctrine is directly related to two features of
the test.  First, mechanical functionality is unique among existing limiting
doctrines because it does not require courts to consider confusion at all.
Utilitarian features are not eligible for trademark protection regardless of
any confusion that may result from use of that design by others.102  Second,
the Supreme Court’s concern about potential conflict with the substantial
existing body of patent law caused it to put a heavy thumb on the scale
against trademark protection for features that have any utilitarian function
whatsoever.103  Its decision in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.
defines features as “essential to the use or purpose” of an article whenever
those features are not “ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary.”104
99 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
100 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000); see also Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 163 (requiring secondary meaning for color trademarks).
101 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (quoting
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
102 See id. at 29 (holding that if a product feature is functional, competitors may copy it
even if it would be protected against copying by other trademark principles and even
though confusion may result); Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65 (stating that regardless of con-
fusion, the functionality doctrine aims to prevent the inhibition of competition).
103 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (“A utility patent is strong evidence that the features
therein claimed are functional.”); Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d
1197, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding the shape and size of flash-frozen ice cream func-
tional partly because of expired utility patents).
104 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30.
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Mechanical functionality is an effective limiting doctrine because courts
can resolve cases early and efficiently, avoiding fact-intensive inquiry into
either consumer confusion or the adequacy of alternative designs that the
defendant might have used.105  To take one recent example, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed summary judgment against the maker of Quilted Northern
toilet paper, which claimed that a “diamond-shaped embossed design on the
tissue” was a protectable trademark.106  The court relied on two key facts to
support the finding of functionality: the plaintiff had secured utility patents
on the way the design “improve[d] (perceived) softness and bulk, and
reduce[d] nesting and ridging,”107 and it ran advertisements that “link[ed]
the quilted feature to numerous utilitarian benefits, such as softness, com-
fort, and absorption.”108  The court disregarded the possibility that consum-
ers might identify the design with the plaintiff’s product (which is, after all,
called Quilted Northern), and it refused to consider other patterns the defen-
dant might have chosen instead.109  A minority of courts still become entan-
gled in more complex speculation about the availability of alternative
designs.110  Increasingly, however, judges interpret TrafFix to enable, and
indeed require, efficient resolution of mechanical functionality disputes.111
We think this is the correct reading of the case.
105 See, e.g., id. at 33–34 (“[T]he functionality of the spring design means that competi-
tors need not explore whether other spring juxtapositions might be used.  The dual-spring
design is not an arbitrary flourish in the configuration of MDI’s product; it is the reason
the device works.  Other designs need not be attempted.”); Specialized Seating, Inc. v.
Greenwich Indus. L.P., 616 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010) (“All of the claimed features are
functional; none was added to produce a distinctive appearance that would help consum-
ers identify the product’s source.”); Eppendorf–Netheler–Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH,
289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Although alternative designs are relevant to the utilita-
rian test of functionality, alternative designs are not germane to the traditional test for
functionality.  Each of the eight design elements identified by Eppendorf is essential to the
use or purpose of the [product], and is not arbitrary or ornamental features.”).
106 Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 647 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir.
2011).
107 Id. at 729.
108 Id. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Id. at 731 (“[W]e do not doubt that there are many other available functional
designs for toilet paper (indeed, market-leader Charmin proves there are), but if the
Quilted Diamond Design is a solution to a problem, as Georgia-Pacific claimed it to be in
its patents, it is functional and thus remains in the sphere of patent protection and not in
that of trademark.  Accordingly, because we find the design to be functional, the fact that
there are numerous alternative designs does not, on its own, render the design nonfunc-
tional and incidental.” (citations omitted)).
110 See, e.g., Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(determining that alternative designs remain relevant even after TrafFix).
111 See Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore, Int’l, Inc., No. 12-3545, 2013
WL 4838792, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (rejecting the plaintiff’s “invitation to drift
back into the error of inquiring about possible alternative designs”); Jay Franco & Sons,
Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]atent law alone protects useful
designs from mimicry; the functionality doctrine polices the division of responsibilities
between patent and trademark law by invalidating marks on useful designs.”); Tie Tech,
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Courts have been much less successful in cases involving aesthetic or
ornamental design features.  In TrafFix, the Supreme Court explicitly
included such features under the protective umbrella of functionality doc-
trine.112  At the same time, however, it suggested that courts in these cases
should consider whether granting trademark rights over aesthetic features
“would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”113
This phrasing potentially reintroduces the questions of alternative design
and the consumer perception of the link between a claimed feature and the
markholder’s “reputation.”  It also disregards potential conflicts between
trademarks for aesthetic features and the limits of design patent and copy-
right law, notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court made many of its
most well-known pronouncements about the importance of copying and
competition in cases that involved design patents.114  As a result, courts con-
tinue to intermingle confusion reasoning with their aesthetic functionality
determinations.  And despite the language in TrafFix, some circuit courts
persist in their refusal to recognize any limiting doctrine for aesthetic prod-
uct features.115  Overall, calling the current doctrinal landscape of aesthetic
functionality chaotic would be an understatement.116
The recent dispute between fashion houses Christian Louboutin and
Yves Saint Laurent concerning red outsoles on women’s shoes demonstrates
the difficulty.117  In its opinion, the Second Circuit fretted about inherent
conflict between promotion of competition and prevention of confusion no
fewer than three times, each time formulating the tradeoffs somewhat differ-
ently.118  When it explained the aesthetic functionality doctrine, the court
Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] product’s manufacturer
‘does not have rights under trade dress law to compel its competitors to resort to alterna-
tive designs which have a different set of advantages and disadvantages.  Such is the realm
of patent law.’” (quoting Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d
1009, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999))).
112 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001).
113 Id. at 32–33 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).  Some courts go so far as to say that the
existence of a design patent is persuasive evidence of non-functionality. See, e.g., In re Bec-
ton-Dickson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
115 See, e.g., Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418 (6th
Cir. 2012) (expressing doubt about whether the Sixth Circuit had adopted an aesthetic
functionality and what test applies); Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech.
Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Our circuit has consistently
rejected the concept of aesthetic functionality.”).
116 See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 848–50 (2011);
Michael S. Mireles, Jr., Aesthetic Functionality, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 156–57 (2013).
117 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d
Cir. 2012).
118 Compare id. at 216 (explaining that trademark law, rather than granting a monopoly,
“seeks to preserve a ‘vigorously competitive market’ for the benefit of consumers” (quoting
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2001))), with id. at 222
(“[C]ourts must consider both the markholder’s right to enjoy the benefits of its effort to
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laid out a cumbersome sequence of inquiries in which the question of aes-
thetic functionality could be considered only after resolving all other issues of
protectability and confusion.119  The court warned that it was difficult to dis-
entangle source identification from “aesthetic function,” thereby suggesting
that any amount of confusion about source could negate an aesthetic func-
tionality determination.120  And it emphasized that the issue could be
decided only through a “fact-specific inquiry” and never by “per se rules.”121
To make matters worse, after discussing the aesthetic functionality doctrine
and single-color marks for nine pages of the Federal Reporter,122 the court
eventually sidestepped the question entirely by construing Louboutin’s mark
narrowly to cover only contrasting red outsoles, and not all-red shoes like
those Yves Saint Laurent sold.123
We have no doubt that ornamental design features can have a significant
competitive impact.  It is difficult to imagine, for example, how one could
effectively sell strawberry-flavored ice cream that was not pink.124  Similarly, a
pool hall’s particular arrangement of pool tables, dark wood, and neon beer
signs may reflect common attributes of a motif that many people desire when
they go out to drink and shoot pool.125
Granting exclusive control over any features demanded by customers is
risky business.  It may eliminate potential consumer errors about the connec-
tion between different brands, but it also may burden would-be market
entrants, reduce consumer choices, and impede innovation.  These are
distinguish its product and the public’s right to the ‘vigorously competitive market[ ]’ pro-
tected by the Lanham Act . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Yurman, 262 F.3d
at 115))), and id. at 224 (stating that “the [aesthetic] functionality test, carefully applied,
can accommodate consumers’ somewhat conflicting interests in being assured enough
product differentiation to avoid confusion as to source and in being afforded the benefits
of competition among producers” (alteration in original) (quoting Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978–79 (2d Cir. 1987))).
119 See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 216–17.
120 Id. at 222.
121 See id. at 222–23.
122 Id. at 216–24.
123 Id. at 228.
124 Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203–04 (11th
Cir. 2004) (finding color of strawberry ice cream functional because it indicates flavor,
even though the ice cream was artificially colored); see McKenna, supra note 116, at 853–54
(“Farm equipment does not work better because it is green—it does not till better, work
longer, or cut more reliably—just as strawberry-flavored flash-frozen ice cream does not
taste better because it is pink.  If, however, consumers expect their farm equipment to be
green or their strawberry-flavored ice cream to be pink, then those colors serve non-source-
related functions, and they do so even if consumers also associate the colors with John
Deere and Dippin’ Dots, respectively.” (footnote omitted)).
125 Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 2001).  In this
actual case, there may have been enough similar decorative elements on the whole to jus-
tify the court’s conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate.  At times, however,
the court appeared to rely on similarities of quite ordinary features, id. at 1263, that, even
if they identified source, should remain available for other competitors to use.
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strange outcomes for an area of law that is supposed to make markets more
competitive.  At one time the narrow subject matter of trademarks would
have avoided these conflicts, but that time is long gone.  While courts have
developed an effective defensive doctrine for mechanical functionality that
structurally prioritizes utilitarian features over prevention of confusion, they
have been unable to do the same for other features of product design.  One
significant reason is their inability to accept that avoiding consumer confu-
sion is only the means for trademark law to promote competition, not the
end in itself.  Prevention of confusion often can reduce meaningful competi-
tion, and there is no reason to believe that the first goal is systematically more
important for consumer welfare than the second.126
2. Third-Party Promotions
Third parties often need to incorporate existing marks in promotion of
their own goods or services.127  An obvious example is comparative advertis-
ing by direct competitors of the markholder.  Other situations include uses of
a mark by third parties whose businesses intersect with the markholder’s—
resellers,128 repairers,129 or brokers,130 to name a few.  Finally, in the “clas-
sic” fair use scenario131 a producer draws on the original “dictionary” mean-
ing of a trademark to describe its products.132
Current trademark law covers these situations with a doctrinal pot-
pourri—“classic” fair use under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act,133 nomina-
126 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 20, at 179; Lunney, supra note 68, at 438.
127 We saw this interest in the “first sale” cases such as Prestonettes and Champion Spark
Plug discussed in Part I. See supra notes 28–47 and accompanying text.  In those cases, a
refusal to allow any use of the trademark in question would prevent consumers from learn-
ing about the nature of the product.
128 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947) (discussing
dealers); Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (requiring a clear showing of confusion against a reseller who advertised the
availability of genuine Swarovski crystal using the Swarovski trademark); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v.
eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving online seller eBay’s use of the Tiffany
mark for authentic Tiffany products).
129 See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 484 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that a repair shop could use the brand logo of the machines that it
repaired); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351, supplemented,
413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (same).
130 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir.
2010) (allowing automobile brokers to use trademark of cars they sold); Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing options exchange
to refer to trademarks of underlying funds on which it offered options).
131 The “classic” label distinguishes fair use under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act from
the doctrine of nominative fair use. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1152
(9th Cir. 2002).
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impres-
sion I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64
F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).
133 See supra note 132.
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tive fair use,134 comparative advertising,135 and more.136  Rather than clearly
sheltering competition interests based on their own importance, these
approaches often become hopelessly entangled in analysis of consumer con-
fusion.137  In other cases, courts cut to the chase and go straight to a confu-
sion analysis.138  By any route, whether by applying special limiting doctrines
or relying on the prima facie case, most courts hunt for confusion.  They
often vindicate competition interests only to the extent they determine that
confusion is absent.139  This is true even in the descriptive fair use context,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in KP Permanent that the plain-
tiff, and not the defendant, bears the burden on the question of confusion,
and that some amount of confusion is compatible with fair use.  The problem
is that the Court expressly countenances consideration of the extent of likeli-
134 See, e.g., Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1175; Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc.,
425 F.3d 211, 217–21 (3d Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
135 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1968) (considering the
specific facts of the case when determining if there is infringement).
136 In Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding Hous. Inc., the ruling depended on “fair use”
but blended aspects of “classic” and nominative use together, ultimately allowing a scaffold-
ing company to use competitor’s WACO mark in the phrase “Waco-style” because it
“describes the good as being similar to or compatible with Waco’s products.”  278 F.3d 523,
534 (5th Cir. 2002).
137 See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 82–97 (critiquing “classic” and nominative fair use
doctrines and their entanglement with confusion prevention); Mark P. McKenna, Trade-
mark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 821–28 (critiquing ways in which
constant reference to consumer understanding destabilizes trademark law).  For an unu-
sual example of a case where a court finds a likelihood of confusion (at least at the prelimi-
nary injunction stage) yet still finds no liability because of the descriptive fair use doctrine,
see Marketquest Grp., Inc. v. BIC Corp., 11-CV-618 JLS WMC, 2011 WL 5360899 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 7, 2011).
138 See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 484–88 (5th Cir.
2004) (applying typical multifactor confusion test to determine whether independent vac-
uum sale and repair business infringed on Kirby trademark in telephone book advertise-
ment); Bumble Bee Seafoods, L.L.C. v. UFS Indus., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 2105(SHS), 2004 WL
1637017, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (allowing vendor to use Bumble Bee Tuna mark to
describe main ingredient of its tuna salad in business-to-business communication because
retail consumers would not see it and risk confusion); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny’s
Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128, 1130–33 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying standard test for likeli-
hood of confusion to auto repair shop and finding for markholder).
139 See Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 99, 109–10 (2009) (“[A]lthough cast as a ‘defense,’ the protection of comparative
advertising is in fact a rather routine application of the basic premise that, so long as con-
sumers are not confused by the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark, the concerns of
trademark and unfair competition law are not engaged by such use.” (footnote omitted)).
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hood of confusion in determining fair use.140  And courts have done just
that.141
The confusion-oriented approach gives short shrift to the direct benefits
consumers get from many third-party uses of marks.  Forbidding such uses of
the underlying trademark can deprive consumers of important information
that they may need for purchasing decisions.142  It also can disadvantage ser-
vice providers like repairers and resellers who specialize in certain brands, as
well as anyone who needs descriptive language to explain their products
properly, by requiring them to avoid the words that most directly inform the
public about their own offerings.143
Although courts and regulators did not always see comparative advertis-
ing as a similarly procompetitive practice, now they universally support com-
140 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123
(2004) (“It suffices to realize that our holding that fair use can occur along with some
degree of confusion does not foreclose the relevance of the extent of any likely consumer
confusion in assessing whether a defendant’s use is objectively fair.  Two Courts of Appeals
have found it relevant to consider such scope, and commentators and amici here have
urged us to say that the degree of likely consumer confusion bears not only on the fairness
of using a term, but even on the further question whether an originally descriptive term
has become so identified as a mark that a defendant’s use of it cannot realistically be called
descriptive.  [T]o the degree that confusion is likely, a use is less likely to be found
fair . . . .” (alteration in original) (citing Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110
F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997))).
141 Indeed, on remand in that very case, the Ninth Circuit held that the degree of
customer confusion remains a factor in determining fair use. See KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005).  Thus, having found a
fact question on likelihood of confusion that precluded summary judgment for the defen-
dant, the court found that summary judgment on the fair use defense also was inappropri-
ate. Id. (“Among the relevant factors for consideration by the jury in determining the
fairness of the use are the degree of likely confusion, the strength of the trademark, the
descriptive nature of the term for the product or service being offered by [the defendant]
and the availability of alternative descriptive terms, the extent of the use of the term prior
to the registration of the trademark, and any differences among the times and contexts in
which [the defendant] has used the term.”).
142 See generally Grynberg, supra note 77 (discussing interests of consumers who are not
confused in receiving information and existing doctrine’s failure to serve those interests).
143 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 supple-
mented, 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (“It is not disputed that Church may specialize in the
repair of Volkswagen vehicles.  He may also advertise to the effect that he does so, and in
such advertising it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to avoid altogether the use
of the word ‘Volkswagen’ or its abbreviation ‘VW,’ which are the normal terms which, to
the public at large, signify appellant’s cars.”); U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F.
Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he fact that one might acquire trademark rights over
a descriptive identifier like ‘chewy’ or ‘lemon flavored’ cannot deprive society of the
opportunity to be advised by other manufacturers that their candy is chewy or lemon fla-
vored. . . .  The purpose of [§ 33(b)(4)] is to ensure that the according of monopoly trade-
mark rights over descriptive marks (upon a showing of acquired secondary meaning) will
not over-broadly deprive society of the use of those terms in their descriptive sense in
commercial communication.”), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990).
2013] confusion  isn’t  everything 285
petitors’ uses of trademarks to situate their own products or services.144
Reversing its previous hostility to comparative advertising, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) issued an influential report in the 1970s that determined:
“Comparative advertising, when truthful and nondeceptive, is a source of
important information to consumers and assists them in making rational
purchase decisions.  Comparative advertising encourages product improve-
ment and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in the marketplace.”145
By some measures, well over a third of all advertising today may be “compara-
tive” in the sense that the advertiser identifies other products in the course of
promoting its own.146
Outside of trademark law, courts and regulators have understood the
value of comparative advertising and have therefore imposed liability only for
false advertising.  The FTC sets a high bar for finding advertising false—focus-
ing not on confusion (as trademark law now does) but on deception (much
as trademark law once did).147  Modern false advertising law under the Lan-
ham Act (regulated, notably, by the sub-section right next to the one impos-
ing liability for use of unregistered trademarks) does the same: liability arises
only from “false or misleading” descriptions or representations of fact, mak-
ing ample space for truthful comparative advertising.148  The rule that
emerged from a number of landmark false advertising cases now requires a
plaintiff to prove either that a defendant’s challenged comparative state-
144 44 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (1997); see, e.g., August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc.,
59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The FTC believes that consumers gain from comparative
advertising . . . .”); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he public . . . benefits from comparative advertising . . . .”).
145 In Regards to Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (2012); see FED. TRADE
COMM’N, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING (1979), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-compare.htm; see Lawrence D. Gaughan, Advertise-
ments Which Identify “Brand X:” A Trialogue on the Law and Policy, 57 TRADEMARK REP. 309
(1967) (portraying a hypothetical conversation about the shifting attitudes toward unfair
competition law in the 1960s); William L. Wilkie & Paul W. Farris, Comparison Advertising:
Problems and Potential, 39 J. MARKETING 7, 8 (1975) (explaining the FTC’s goal of increasing
consumer information and, as a result, improving the market through increased
competition).
146 See Fred K. Beard, Competition and Combative Advertising: An Historical Analysis, 31 J.
MACROMARKETING 387, 388 (2011) (“Estimates of comparative advertising use suggest it
may be as high as 30 percent to 40 percent of all ads.  Although there have been no recent
content analyses of comparative advertising, some observers suggest a steady increase dur-
ing the first decade of the twenty-first century.” (citations omitted)).
147 Tushnet, supra note 93, at 1327–31 (comparing trademark and false advertising
doctrine).
148 The Lanham Act defines false advertising as a false or misleading description or
representation of fact “in commercial advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents . . .
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B)
(2006); see, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1968) (“[U]se of
another’s trademark to identify the trademark owner’s product in comparative advertising
is not prohibited by either statutory or common law, absent misrepresentation regarding
the products . . . .”).
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ments are literally false or that they in fact misled a significant number of
consumers.149
Courts in trademark cases usually seem to understand the value of the
third-party promotional uses we have described, including comparative
advertising.  However, they apply significantly less stringent standards of
potential confusion than do courts in other areas, where outright falsehood
is required.  A few courts have found comparative advertisements infringing
based on the prospect of consumer confusion, even at times using the con-
cept of initial interest confusion to impose liability.150  More often, courts
insulate comparative advertising from liability, but they demand that it does
not cause confusion.151  At times, courts awkwardly reconcile their recogni-
tion of the competitive importance of comparative advertising and the doctri-
nal dominance of confusion, bending the multifactor test to accommodate a
defendant’s use.  Hence they are often criticized for creating special doc-
trines for particular types of users like resellers, brokers, or repair services.152
Courts have tried to handle certain other types of references to
markholders for identification purposes under the nominative use doctrine,
first articulated in New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks
may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and
third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.153
149 See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2001); Castrol
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 951 (3d Cir. 1993); Johnson & Johnson * Merck Con-
sumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1992);
Tushnet, supra note 93, at 1320.
150 See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel Inc., 832 F.2d
1311, 1315 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding a cable subscription company’s comparative advertise-
ments incorporating a competitor’s trademark likely to create confusion of sponsorship,
because disclaimers were not sufficiently proximate to the infringing statements); Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 846 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding initial
interest confusion against HERBROZAC herbal supplement offered as alternative to
PROZAC prescription drug), aff’d on different grounds, 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). But see
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court and declining to extend initial interest confusion to
“legitimate comparative and contextual advertising”); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc.,
59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[The mere] ‘possibility’ of confusion cannot support an
injunction. . . .  [Otherwise] all comparative references would be forbidden . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
151 See Chanel, 402 F.2d at 565.
152 See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010);
Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting
that context must be considered when applying each digit of the likelihood-of-confusion
test, especially considering the specific circumstances of the case and customer perception
in the marketplace).
153 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted).
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Too often, these factors reduce to the same pursuit of confusion because the
third factor asks almost the same question about consumer perception.154  In
addition, some courts applying nominative use actually shifted burdens onto
the defendant that belonged in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.155  As a conse-
quence, courts have often rejected nominative fair use in cases where they
perceived any risk of any type of confusion, or at least they have refused to
resolve the case on summary judgment because the possibility of such confu-
sion raises questions of fact.156
Overall, unlicensed uses of a trademark in third-party promotion help
ensure both market access for competitors and information for consumers.
Yet all the doctrines deployed in these cases subjugate those competition and
information interests to the avoidance of confusion.
3. Uses in Expressive Works
Our third fact pattern concerns depictions of trademarks in communica-
tive media: books and movies, video games and web sites, newspapers and
magazines, fine art and music.  Courts again process these frequent lawsuits
through a variety of trademark doctrines, sometimes relying simply on the
likelihood of confusion test, and other times using special First Amendment
defenses, nominative and even descriptive fair use.  But here too, many of the
available doctrines—even those tailor-made to protect the speech interests at
stake—are unable to shake free of the anti-confusion imperative.157
Examination of some recent trademark decisions demonstrates the
breadth of such uses now subject to challenge.  In some cases, trademarks
appear in the backdrop in works intended to represent or at least allude to
the real world.  Thus, iconic buildings and billboard advertisements appear
in the background when Spider-Man swings through New York City or when
the Grand Theft Auto video game depicts a Los Angeles neighborhood.158
University of Alabama football players appear in their uniforms in paintings
154 See Dinwoodie, supra note 139, at 110–12; Greg Lastowka, Nominative Use Makes No
Sense (Oct. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338296; McGeveran, supra note 12, at 95–97.
155 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–21 (3d Cir.
2005) (diagnosing this problem in other cases); Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d
900, 908 n.5, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (shifting the burden to the defendant).
156 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th Cir. 1996)
(denying summary judgment where the likelihood of confusion regarding an endorsement
raised issues of fact); Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932,
938, 942 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (rejecting nominative use and denying summary judgment on
questions of fact grounds); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharon Woods Collision Ctr.,
Inc., No. 1:07cv457, 2007 WL 4207158, at *8–9 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2007) (denying sum-
mary judgment because the possibility of confusion raised issues of fact).
157 See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 112–13 (summarizing how frequently trademark’s
“fair use” doctrines collapse into reexamination of confusion issues).
158 See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.
2008); Sherwood 48 Assocs. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 76 F. App’x 389, 391 (2d Cir. 2003).
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intended to capture scenes from historic college football games.159  At other
times, storytellers draw on the cultural meaning of a mark to make a point—
about the markholder itself, or about something the markholder represents.
When the producers of the comedy film The Hangover II wanted to show a
character’s social ineptitude and snobbery, they had him carry a knockoff
Louis Vuitton bag and waspishly object, mispronouncing the brand name,
when his friend touched the bag.160  The band Aqua used Barbie as its refer-
ence point to mock the superficial lifestyle it believed the doll repre-
sented,161 just as Tom Forsythe used Barbie dolls in his conceptual art.162
Haute Diggity Dog made dog toys in the shape of handbags to mock Louis
Vuitton and other luxury brands.163  When web sites for consumer com-
plaints merely use trademarks to identify markholders, they can get sued
too.164
Well into the 1990s, most courts were quite hard on such depictions of
trademarks.  Similar to their focus on alternative designs in functionality
cases, courts often found these depictions infringing because they believed
the defendants had “alternative avenues” through which they could have
achieved their communicative goal without using the plaintiffs’ trade-
marks.165  These courts implicitly concluded that any potential confusion
about the association of the markholder with the expressive use would cause
such serious harm that communication values could only be accommodated
if absolutely necessary.166  Not surprisingly, they rarely believed accommoda-
159 See Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1282 (11th Cir.
2012).  In the interest of full disclosure, one of us (McKenna) was the lead author of an
amicus brief supporting the defendant in this case and argued on behalf of amici.  The
other (McGeveran) signed the amicus brief.
160 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172,
174–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
161 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
162 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
163 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir.
2007).
164 See, e.g., deVere Grp. GmbH v. Opinion Corp., 877 F. Supp. 2d 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(lawsuit by financial company for use of its trade name in complaints on gripe site
PissedConsumer.com).
165 See Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987); Dall. Cow-
boys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979); Am.
Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998);
Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. for Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D.
Ill. 1994).
166 Cases in which the user lacked alternative avenues would resemble the rare situa-
tions covered by copyright’s merger doctrine—the exclusive right yields because there is
just one viable way to express an idea. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675,
678 (1st Cir. 1967) (“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the
topic necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited num-
ber, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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tion was necessary.  Plaintiffs and courts can almost always brainstorm differ-
ent ways a speaker might have conveyed roughly the same message without
using trademarks—especially when they focus only on the content of the
message and not its humor, immediacy, realism, or pungency.167
Most courts facing these issues in the last decade or so have adopted
some variety of a so-called “First Amendment defense,” which they usually
attribute to the Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi.168 Rogers
explicitly repudiated the “alternative avenues” approach,169 and the test it
articulated allows use of a mark in the context of an expressive work unless
the use has “no artistic relevance” or it “explicitly misleads as to the source or
the content of the work.”170  Now courts following this lead routinely say that
curtailment of free expression must be weighed against likelihood of confu-
sion rather than assuming automatically that such artistic uses must avoid all
potential for confusion.171
This is a big improvement.  But it would be wrong to say that courts
considering media depictions have set consumer confusion aside completely.
They are still weighing confusion against expression, as stated in Rogers.172
Indeed, many still pay tribute to the importance of confusion by emphasizing
(or simply asserting) that the uses before them would only result in minimal
confusion.  The Hangover II decision should have been stating the obvious
when it declared, “[I]f a trademark is not used, in any direct sense, to desig-
nate the source or sponsorship of the defendant’s work, then the consumer
interest in avoiding deception is too slight to warrant application of the Lan-
ham Act.”173  This statement also suggests that the analysis might change if
167 See, e.g., Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (“It is not for this Court to
name films, but it appears she has rejected ideas such as ‘Dairy Princesses,’ ‘Milk Maids,’ or
any other formulation, except that single title which touches [Dairy Queen’s] mark.”).
168 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989).
169 Id. at 999.
170 Id.  The specific question in that case was whether the defendant could use Ginger
Rogers’s name in the title of a fictional film about dancers whose nicknames were Fred and
Ginger. Id. at 996.  The court’s test therefore specifically focused on use of a mark in the
title of an expressive work, but the case has been applied more broadly in recent years.
171 See Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, “The Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became Relevant:
The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilu-
tion, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 1278 (2003).
172 Rogers, 875 F.3d at 999 (“[I]n general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion out-
weighs the public interest in free expression.”).  Ninth Circuit cases drive the point home
by italicizing the word “outweighs” in this quote. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,
353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683
F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that court must “weigh the public interest in free
expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion”) (quoting Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir.1989)).
173 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Syler v. Woodruff, 610 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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the risk of confusion were greater.  The precise mechanics for weighing con-
fusion created by these kinds of uses vary from one court to another.  Some
courts still interpret “explicit misleadingness” in a way that comes quite close
to an inquiry into whether the use is likely to cause confusion.  In the Second
Circuit, where Rogers originated, courts long engaged in free-form balancing
of the full traditional multifactor analysis of likelihood of confusion against
the speech interests at stake.174  Other circuits have combined Rogers and
confusion reasoning in various ways.175  And some hiccups remain.  A num-
ber of Ninth Circuit district courts have recently conflated the “no artistic
relevance” requirement with the nominative fair use requirement that the
defendant’s communication refer to the plaintiff’s mark.176
The speech character of trademarks implicates interests distinct from
the competition values noted above.  A trademark might be crucial to com-
munication about a company or product—how does one praise or criticize
174 See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993)
(introducing this concept); see also Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d
497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996) (using the likelihood of confusion test before looking at other
concerns); Kensington Publ’g Corp. v. Gutierrez, No. 05 Civ. 10529(LTS)(AJP), 2009 WL
4277080, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009) (finding it necessary to resolve both likelihood of
confusion and explicitly misleading inquiries, and finding both unsuitable for summary
judgment); Lemme v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 433, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding
artistic relevance and then turning to confusion); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc.,
112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding First Amendment protections and likeli-
hood of confusion tests must be balanced); cf. Syler v. Woodruff, 610 F. Supp. 2d 256,
264–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (combining traditional confusion, Rogers, and a secondary mean-
ing test).
175 See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 667–68 (5th
Cir. 2000) (requiring likelihood of confusion to be “particularly compelling” to outweigh
First Amendment interests, but affirming lower court’s finding that it was); Martha Eliza-
beth, Inc. v. Scripps Networks Interactive, LLC, No. 1:10–CV–1244, 2011 WL 1750711, at
*21, *25 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 2011) (granting partial preliminary injunction against defen-
dant B360 because of likelihood of confusion and related failure to show the use was not
explicitly misleading); Club Me´diterrane´e, S.A. v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No.
04–20273–CIV., 2004 WL 5589591, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding Rogers satisfied because
likelihood of confusion was low). But see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 926
(6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]here the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use of a
celebrity’s identity is protected by the First Amendment, the likelihood of confusion test is
not appropriate because it fails to adequately consider the interests protected by the First
Amendment.”).
176 This interpretation appears to have originated in Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F.
Supp. 2d 883, 888–89 (N.D. Cal. 2010). See Dita, Inc. v. Mendez, No. CV 10–6277 PSG
(FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010) (“This case . . . differs materi-
ally . . . [because i]n such cases, the First Amendment was implicated because the defen-
dant used a trademarked term to describe or comment upon the plaintiff’s mark or
product—not merely to promote its own product.”); Masters Software, Inc. v. Discovery
Commc’ns, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (holding that the First
Amendment was not implicated because defendant’s name was not an allusion to plain-
tiff’s trademark).
2013] confusion  isn’t  everything 291
Barbie or Nike without using their names?177  Trademarks may be necessary
for faithful portrayals of our ubiquitously branded world and for evoking the
ideas crystallized most effectively in modern brands.178  Recently some schol-
ars have also argued that marks convey other important signals to consumers
beyond source, through which individuals can fulfill distinct goals in aspects
of their lives unrelated to direct purchasing behavior.179  The Supreme
Court increasingly emphasizes that commercial speech of all types has value
for citizens, even if it is less than the value of traditionally favored forms of
discourse such as politics or art.180
While courts seem increasingly to understand the importance of protect-
ing the type of expressive uses we have highlighted, their doctrinal tools still
sometimes weigh the absence of confusion heavily.  We think it is obvious
that the cultural value of Andy Warhol’s 32 Campbell’s Soup Cans overcomes
any slight risk that a few people would mistakenly assume an affiliation
between the soup company and his art, but under current doctrine this is not
always clear.181
177 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.
1992); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).
178 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 402 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplug-
ged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–73 (1993).
179 See Desai, supra note 81, at 987 (“Marketing and business disciplines look to a more
open, democratic understanding of brands precisely because such an approach enhances
the value of brands and fits with the way brands operate in the marketplace.  Trademark
law ought embrace just such a perspective.  Furthermore, an open approach creates room
for individuals and communities to use brands as a locus of personal expression, political
debate, and market discussion.”); Dilbary, supra note 81, at 622–23 (“Specifically, three
inseparable demands reside within a branded product.  The first is a demand for the prod-
uct itself: the physical and functional attributes of a suit, a perfume, a salad dressing. . . .
The second kind of demand is for intra-brand information about the product’s credence
qualities. . . .  The third demand is for the image or psychological pleasure associated with
the mark’s fame. . . .  Put differently, the trademark does not act to increase sales only by
economizing on consumers’ search costs or by minimizing consumers’ error costs.” (foot-
notes omitted)); Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 803 (2012) (“[T]he
‘quality’ sought by consumers in the market for status goods is the quality of the message
the brand conveys: its ability to communicate social status to others.” (emphasis omitted)).
180 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (holding that
Rhode Island statute prohibiting alcohol price advertisements violated First Amendment);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765, 770
(1976) (striking down a Virginia law penalizing pharmacists who advertised any price on
prescription drugs and finding a strong societal interest in the “free flow of [consumer]
information”); Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial
Speech in Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607, 642; Martin
H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 67 (2007).
181 See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1013 (2004).
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B. Taking Stock of These Approaches
These examples illustrate a common theme.  In each instance, critical
values other than confusion are at stake: fair competition (product features),
open communication (uses in expressive works), or both (comparative adver-
tising and other third-party promotions).  Yet in all of these cases, courts
develop doctrines that insist on lack of confusion as a condition of the limita-
tion, or they otherwise let their concerns about possible confusion infect
their analyses.  In some cases, this leads courts to bad decisions because they
give insufficient weight to competition or communication values in order to
prevent confusion—often confusion of a type unlikely to harm consumers or
markholders significantly.
More frequently, the possibility of a costly lawsuit scares people away
from trademark-related activities that the law should allow, or even
encourage.182  That is true even if defendants ultimately are likely to have
their uses vindicated.  For example, despite considerable scholarly criticism
of the treatment of parody in trademark law,183 most courts do find their way
to the correct results in parody cases, particularly after appeal.184  But even
when courts find ways to accommodate these uses, problems for defendants
arise much earlier.  As one of us has argued previously, before courts render
decisions, and often before markholders even file suit, the prospect of
lengthy and costly litigation discourages beneficial unlicensed uses of trade-
182 See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 61–66 (discussing chilling effect of uncertain and
burdensome limiting doctrines for expressive uses).
183 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody As Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2–3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2170498 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the
Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive
Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 913 (2005); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters
of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1073–80 (2009); David A. Simon,
The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 33 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161622 (last vis-
ited Oct. 17, 2013).
184 In their recent examination of brand parodies, Dogan and Lemley cite only two
court cases since 2000 holding a parodist liable for trademark infringement, Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), which only found questions of material fact that
precluded summary judgment, and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d
974 (E.D. Mo. 2008), which we would argue was clearly wrongly decided, even under cur-
rent law. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 183, at 16, 35; see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s
Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding no likelihood of confusion
in the context of a claim of infringement of STARBUCKS mark by CHARBUCKS coffee,
but remanding for dilution analysis).  The more representative case is Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002), which found no trademark violation
and concluded, “[t]he parties are advised to chill.”  Bad outcomes are more common in
some of the other areas we discuss in this Article, however, and in any event, as noted
below, they do not represent the only threat to values like competition and
communication.
2013] confusion  isn’t  everything 293
marks.185  Funneling every question through the likelihood of confusion
analysis typically requires defendants to engage in protracted trench warfare.
Trademark cases are expensive.  Less than six percent of cases end in dam-
ages awards, according to one analysis.186  But the legal fees can be enor-
mous,187 not least because of the difficulty of adjudicating likelihood of
confusion.188  Most alternative doctrinal approaches we have seen, such as
aesthetic functionality or nominative fair use, can be equally time consuming,
fact specific, and expensive to litigate.  Worse, because defendants are often
unsure which of these limiting doctrines a court will recognize or apply, they
must argue them all, and simultaneously mount a robust defense on likeli-
hood of confusion anyway.  And regardless, since almost all of the alterna-
tives collapse into a confusion inquiry, the amorphous and fact-specific issue
of consumer perception takes center stage.189
This expense and uncertainty, in turn, influences choices made prior to
any formal legal action.  Markholders stoke those fears by perpetuating
broad claims of rights in cease-and-desist demand letters that can misrepre-
sent the current state of the law, or at least make a very one-sided case that
the recipient’s use of a mark infringes on it.190  For example, last year Pen-
185 See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 62–63 (discussing the expense of litigation and
describing trademark rights clearance practices to avoid liability); McGeveran, supra note
47, at 2279–86 (discussing administrative costs in trademark law); see also Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 183, at 17 (discussing the dual problems of incorrect results and administrative
costs in litigation).
186 Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 585, 622 (2008).
187 LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2011 REPORT OF
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-157 (2011) (reporting an average litigation cost of $401,000 in
trademark cases where the amount in controversy was less than $1 million).
188 Because confusion is a question of fact, summary judgment is disfavored. See Clicks
Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing sum-
mary judgment and stating that the “likelihood of confusion is routinely submitted for jury
determination as a question of fact” (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d
1352, 1355 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985))); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d
611, 616 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] motion for summary judgment in trademark infringement
cases must be approached with great caution.”); Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d
1056, 1062–63 (3d Cir. 1991) (referring to summary judgment in trademark cases as the
“exception”); 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 132:120–32:121.
189 See McGeveran, supra note 47, at 2275 (“[Trademark litigation is] uncertain,
lengthy, and expensive.  Courts choose from a grab bag of doctrines related to ‘fair use,’
configured somewhat differently in various jurisdictions.”).
190 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 644 (“[I]n
the pre-litigation enforcement stage, the assessment of the strength of one’s trademark
and its corresponding scope of protection is privately conducted, which means that the
trademark owner can feel free to claim strength where there is none.  As there are few
bright-line rules in trademark law, this self-assessment is prone to subjectivity.  Trademark
owners cross the line into bullying when they take advantage of this subjectivity and con-
tend that their trademark is worthy of strong protection without the evidence to support
high levels of consumer recognition.” (footnote omitted)); Port, supra note 186, at 589
(“[S]ome trademark holders send thousands of cease-and-desist letters to the point that
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guin Books objected to the proposed cover of humorist David Thorne’s self-
published book, which featured a penguin making a rude gesture.  Ignoring
the shift toward Rogers v. Grimaldi and protection for parody and expressive
uses found in more recent decisions,191 Penguin’s lawyer sent a dense four-
page cease-and-desist letter that cited only cases from the 1990s and ear-
lier.192  Those cases are no longer representative, but their existence chills
legitimate uses.  Even when lawyers engage in no more than zealous advocacy
and craft scrupulously accurate cease-and-desist letters, they certainly know
that recipients are likely to surrender rather than litigate.  As a consequence,
most disputes of the types we discuss in this article never enter the court-
house door.
A doctrine that often reaches correct results, but only by imposing high
litigation costs, offers cold comfort to most would-be competitors or com-
mentators.  Some of those affected will be businesses challenging an incum-
bent markholder in a market, and litigation risk will add to the already
daunting barriers to entry.  Others will be artists, critics, or gadflies of limited
means.  Even when they have resources—such as a movie studio producing a
big-budget film—these players may well choose not to risk litigation.  Indeed,
intermediaries with the capacity to fight (not to mention their insurers) often
take the most conservative approach of all toward using claimed trademarks
without permission.
Rather than fight to vindicate their right to make unlicensed use, people
clear rights, design around competitors’ “aesthetic” features, or engage in
circumlocution to avoid references when they would have every right to use
the trademark.  Over time, myths arise about the necessity of securing
licenses, and these harden into standard practice.193  When parties who
would like to use a mark elect not to pursue that use, it deprives consumers
(and society as a whole) of the benefits their uses would have generated.  The
result is less competition, less speech, or, at best, some potentially inadequate
alternatives.  Markholders, meanwhile, can use the threat of trademark litiga-
tion as a weapon to curb competition and stifle negative commentary.
there are now ‘sample’ cease-and-desist letters available on the internet.  These cease-and-
desist letters are followed by hundreds of trademark infringement filings.  These cases are
almost never prosecuted to a conclusion on their merits.  In fact, if prosecuted to a trial on
their merits, the trademark holder/plaintiff would likely lose because they are not very
meritorious claims.” (footnotes omitted)).
191 See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
192 DAVID THORNE, I’LL GO HOME THEN; IT’S WARM AND HAS CHAIRS 93–96 (2012)
(including reprinted version of cease-and-desist letter).
193 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007) (“[T]rademark law not only provides supracompensatory mone-
tary remedies, but also strongly presumes that prevailing rights-holders deserve injunc-
tions, both preliminary and permanent.  It should therefore come as no surprise when
trademark users who could mount a decent defense against an infringement claim never-
theless choose to seek a license.” (footnotes omitted)); McKenna, supra note 137, at 823
(“[T]he modern marketplace abounds with licensing arrangements unimaginable in the
traditional trademark era.”).
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Trademark law badly needs more robust and predictable limiting doc-
trines.  These doctrines would allow courts to identify certain categories of
cases as potentially impinging on competition or communication and set
those cases apart for special treatment.  Importantly, courts need to be able
to resolve such cases expeditiously and with few administrative costs.  That
means these limiting doctrines must look at confusion differently—some-
times disregarding it altogether, but in all such cases responding only to the
most harmful forms of confusion.  The next Part lays the groundwork for
some limiting doctrines of this sort.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMITING DOCTRINES
We turn in this final Part to reform.  What types of doctrinal innovations
can effectively protect defendants whose uses promote the goals of competi-
tion and communication identified in this Article?  This Part lays out a strat-
egy for handling cases that raise these competing interests.
In summary, we suggest a three-step approach to such cases.  First, courts
should identify categories of cases that raise particularly important competi-
tion or speech concerns and make threshold decisions about whether the
facts in a particular case fit within those categories.194  Second, within those
categories, courts should think about likelihood of confusion very differently
than they do now.  This will require them to distinguish between types of
confusion and treat some more seriously than others.195  Indeed, in certain
categories of cases, they will need to ignore some types of confusion alto-
gether.  Third, in all the cases identified at the outset as presenting competi-
tion or communication interests, courts ought to limit the scope of the
remedies available so as to match them more closely to any harm caused by
relevant confusion.196
The doctrinal approach we describe is both more nuanced (in that it
acknowledges and deals with conflicting values in trademark law) and more
structured (in that it yields a clearer decisional flowchart for these cases than
the indeterminate confusion-based analysis and grab bag of vaguely elabo-
rated defenses that dominate trademark law today).  While it may seem like a
cumbersome process, it is much less so than the current practice, which
requires full confusion analysis of uses that should be insulated from trade-
mark liability altogether, with unsatisfactory results.
A. Threshold Classification
Canonical scholarship in law and economics favors the development of
clearer rules for fact patterns that arise repeatedly.197  The capacious, mul-
tifactor likelihood of confusion test is nearly the opposite of a bright-line
194 See infra Section III.A.
195 See infra Section III.B.
196 See infra Section III.C.
197 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 266 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
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rule.  Yet we know that certain fact patterns typically raise issues besides likeli-
hood of confusion—including the product design features, third-party pro-
motional uses, and uses in expressive works discussed in Part II.  Courts can
organize these and other predictable types of cases into prescribed catego-
ries, while leaving room to identify other unusual situations that they might
encounter.
Moreover, while these categories of repeated trademark disputes present
values like competition and communication on the defendant’s side of the
scale, we showed in Part I that they also have a strong tendency to implicate
only weaker forms of confusion on the plaintiff’s side.198  These generally are
not the most serious cases of passing off that have always stood as trademark
law’s central concerns.  Analyzing all of these situations through the same ill-
fitting lens of likelihood of confusion imposes significant costs on courts and
litigants.  In the terms of decision theory, we are now paying very high admin-
istrative costs to prevent harm that is both relatively modest in severity and
relatively unlikely to occur.199  And we are doing it to the detriment of other
key values distinct from the prevention of confusion.
Thus, in our view, the first question a court should ask when hearing a
trademark case is one of classification: does this case fall within a category
that merits special treatment?  We suggest the only criterion here should be
whether the challenged use of the trademark strongly implicates competition
or communication values other than confusion.  Most run-of-the-mill trade-
mark cases will not, and courts can proceed to handle those cases under ordi-
nary infringement principles.  But if the facts presented do implicate other
concerns besides confusion prevention, the court should approach liability
and remedy differently.
Engaging first in this classification exercise offers multiple advantages.
Perhaps most significantly, this approach places the fundamental competi-
tion and communication values at the forefront.  Rather than pretending
that an analysis of consumer confusion implicitly accounts for every legiti-
mate concern, this doctrinal structure acknowledges frankly that protection
of trademarks sometimes creates tension with other important values.200  If
DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992). See generally McGeveran, supra note 47, at 2290–91 (applying
insight to trademark defenses).
198 See supra subsection I.B.1.
199 See McGeveran, supra note 47, at 2284–86.
200 See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
827, 886 (2004) (“Trademark rights, then, are a product of far more—and far less—than
what ‘real’ consumers think or believe.  The characteristics of the ‘ordinarily prudent con-
sumer’ are partly empirically determined, but they are also shaped by judicial assumptions
about consumer beliefs and values, by economic policy concerns, such as the preservation
of after markets, and also by a number of doctrinal and constitutional limitations.”); Lun-
ney, supra note 68, at 481 (“[T]he issue of whether confusion should be actionable turns
not merely on a factual analysis of whether confusion exists, but on a policy determination
that the type of confusion present warrants legal intervention.  Too often courts simply
plug the facts of a case into their version of the Polaroid factor test and pretend that the
result is necessarily a sensible one.  By doing so, they foreclose a careful consideration of
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an infringement finding would significantly impair other important values
then judges should figure that out before wrestling with likelihood of confu-
sion.  Forcing these conflicts to the surface will allow more clear-eyed doctri-
nal development.201
Identifying cases deserving of special treatment right off the bat also will
help courts move them through litigation more efficiently.  By segregating
cases before reaching the likelihood of confusion test, the initial sorting can
help reduce the cost of litigation—and therefore the chilling effect—for
cases within the identified categories.  These “fast lane” doctrines need not
be affirmative defenses in the sense that they are entirely distinct from the
prima facie case of infringement; what concerns us is that they can be raised
and decided early in the litigation because they do not depend on questions
for which as much factual development typically will be necessary.202
Our approach thus shares the goals of other proposals that sought early
interventions on behalf of socially valuable uses of trademarks.203  But those
other proposals generally fall prey to the dominance of confusion reasoning
and the circularity of consulting consumer perception.  For example, a num-
ber of scholars and courts worked to establish a threshold “trademark use”
requirement that they hoped would, in one doctrinal stroke, remove cases as
varied as keyword advertising, expressive uses, parodies, nominative uses,
comparative advertising, and others from the ambit of trademark law.204
Under this doctrine, defendants would not be liable if they used the plain-
whether the confusion present is a type of confusion that is likely to generate inefficiencies
sufficient to justify a legal prohibition in the first place.” (footnote omitted)).
201 See Dinwoodie, supra note 139, at 101 (“Conceiving of limits as defenses would help
ensure that the (often unstated) values underlying socially desirable third party uses are
given greater prominence and not too readily disregarded if they happen to conflict with
confusion-avoidance concerns that are historically powerful drivers of trademark protec-
tion.  Such an approach would also ameliorate the uncertainties caused by the acceptance
of extended (and increasingly amorphous) notions of actionable harm in trademark
law.”); McGeveran, supra note 12, at 71–74 (arguing that the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis fails to consider balancing interests in free expression and other goals).
202 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 32 (“[C]ases eligible for the fast lane should be
those where the outcome was fairly predictable from the beginning, far from equipoise.
Applying presumptions to those cases, as discussed above, further lightens any burden of
persuasion.”).
203 See infra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
204 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2007) (“[T]he trademark use doctrine, properly applied,
serves as a limited tool for identifying classes of behavior that cannot constitute infringe-
ment.”); see also Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,”
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 395–96 (2006) (“In the course of evaluating infringement and
dilution claims in this new and unique setting [on the Internet], courts have too often lost
sight of the important limiting function the trademark use requirement should play.”);
Goldman, supra note 79, at 593–95 (finding a trademark use requirement in the Lanham
Act and arguing for rigorous application of the doctrine to immunize search providers
from liability); Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 603, 708 (2004) (“[T]he misinterpretation of the trademark use requirement—or
more accurately, the flat-out disregard of that requirement—has given rise to a veritable
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tiff’s mark in some way other than “as a mark.”205  Both of us have argued
before that these efforts were doomed because they required courts to con-
sult the very same fickle consumer perception that anchors the likelihood of
confusion analysis.206  Unsurprisingly (to us, at least) these approaches have
not turned out to be effective.207  Our approach avoids these problems, at
least to a much greater degree.
Finally, initial categorization recognizes that attempts to reconcile con-
flicts between confusion and other values on a case-by-case basis are not suc-
cessful or appropriate.  Courts need to pre-commit to tradeoffs between
values at the level of doctrinal structure.  These pre-commitments can vary in
their intensity, as described in the next Section.  But pre-commitment strate-
gies integrate crucial value tradeoffs directly into trademark law’s doctrinal
structure.  Obviously we do not ask judges in patent cases to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether the public interest is better served by conferring exclu-
sivity over an invention or allowing the public to use it.  Those broader policy
considerations are instead channeled through a series of more specific doc-
trinal determinations—most significantly, whether the claimed invention is
patentable subject matter and is useful, novel, and non-obvious.208  Unfortu-
nately, because trademark law has developed in such a lopsided fashion with
its overemphasis on confusion, judges confronted with socially beneficial uses
of marks are often asked to make precisely the kinds of open-ended policy
judgments we reject in other settings.  Identifying cases that are appropriate
subjects of limiting doctrines and handling them in a systematic way will
restore rule-of-law principles to trademark adjudication.  And it will place
other important values on the same level of the analysis as consumer confu-
sion rather than subordinating them.
cottage industry among the courts, an entire line of cases that are wrongly decided, that
impose trademark infringement liability where none exists . . . .”).
205 See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 204, at 608 (“Keyword use is not trademark infringe-
ment.  It is, in fact, not conduct that invokes the trademark laws at all because it does not
involve the primary predicate of trademark law, which is that a term or symbol be used by
the party as a mark—meaning in a way so that consumers can plainly perceive the symbol
and associate it with that party’s offering of goods or services.”).
206 See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 79–80 (“The ultimate question posed by the trade-
mark use doctrines asks if a particular use invites an interpretation as a source identi-
fier. . . . An approach to defining trademark use grounded in consumer understanding
collapses completely into a slightly different way of asking the crucial likelihood of confu-
sion question.”); McKenna, supra note 137, at 814 (“In all of these contexts and others, a
court or the Trademark Office must determine whether a contested term performs a
source identifying function or some other function.  And in all cases, the determination
depends in whole or in part on consumer perception of the use.” (footnote omitted)).
207 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that the sale of Internet search keywords including trademarks was a “use in commerce”
under the Lanham Act).  Only a handful of relatively unique cases have relied on “trade-
mark use” to resolve the case.  See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d
400, 409–12 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that competitive pop-up advertisements that appeared
after accessing plaintiff’s website were not a trademark use).
208 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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Many of the classification decisions in our approach will be easy.  Most of
the time, it will be clear when facts plausibly present an issue of, say, compar-
ative advertising or use in expressive works.  Indeed, courts’ experience thus
far applying Rogers v. Grimaldi suggests that they are comfortable making
these sorts of categorization decisions.209  Whatever other difficulties they
have had, courts have not struggled to determine when the defendant’s use is
expressive and therefore subject to the Rogers approach.  But even if the rela-
tive clarity of categorization avoids plunging every case into the murky confu-
sion inquiry, there will of course be some cases in which it is difficult to tell
whether a particular use of a trademark fits in the protected category.  That is
an inevitable consequence of drawing legal boundaries.210
As an example of a tricky initial classification, consider a suit by the
maker of the modernized Volkswagen Beetle against the publisher of a chil-
dren’s board book called Fun Cars.211  The cover depicted the design of the
Beetle—trade dress registered as a trademark—along with plastic rolling
wheels at the bottom.212  As described below,213 we believe trademark law
should observe a categorical defense for expressive uses, and depiction in a
book would clearly qualify.  But is Fun Cars a book or a toy?  The answer isn’t
obvious.  And the resulting analysis could have become a little pedantic, as
trademark law sometimes is (for example: Can books have wheels?  Can toys
have pages?).  The court seemed to consider it a book, but of course existing
doctrine did not require any choice.214  If it was indeed a book, then the use
of the trade dress as part of a book’s content implicated communication val-
ues, and these are too important to be disregarded simply because of a nebu-
lous concern about source association.  Moreover, whatever confusion might
exist is remote from traditional passing off, so harm is quite attenuated, at
best.  If, on the other hand, the object was better considered a toy, then per-
haps the communication values at stake were somewhat less weighty.215
209 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 920 (6th Cir. 2003) (catego-
rizing the use of a celebrity’s name in the title of an artistic work as protected per Rogers);
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.
1989) (classifying the use as a parody, a category within artistic expression and protected
per Rogers); see also E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095,
1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that plaintiff conceded that use in video game “is artis-
tic and that therefore the Rogers test applies”).
210 See Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) (“It is
desirable that the plaintiff should not lose custom by reason of the public mistaking
another manufacturer for it.  It is desirable that the defendant should be free to manufac-
ture watches at Waltham, and to tell the world that it does so.  The two desiderata cannot
both be had to their full extent, and we have to fix the boundaries as best we can.”).
211 Volkswagen AG v. Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 798 (E.D.
Mich. 2009).
212 Id. at 799.
213 See infra subsection III.B.1.
214 Volkswagen, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
215 This is not to imply that toys have no communicative value or that trademark law
ought to reach uses like this.  It is only to say that as compared to books, toys may be less
obviously deserving of special, fast-track treatment.
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Even though initial classification occasionally may be difficult, it has the
significant virtues noted above of honesty, efficiency, and systematic decision-
making.  Under our proposal, courts first decide whether a use fits into cate-
gories that are defined without any regard to consumer confusion.  In other
words, we want judges to start by asking what the use is (is it a product design
feature, comparative advertising, sale of second-hand merchandise, artistic
expression?) rather than what the use is not (does it avoid confusion?).
B. A Different Approach to Confusion
As we have noted, the purpose of engaging in this initial categorization
is to allow courts to identify cases where confusion should be analyzed differ-
ently than the overly broad approach common in modern trademark law.
More specifically, we suggest two types of differential treatment.
First, in some sets of cases that raise particularly significant conflicts with
other values while routinely posing little serious risk of passing off, courts
should disregard confusion entirely.  There may be remedies through unfair
competition law for attendant behavior that is likely to deceive consumers
about actual source.216  But placing a case in this category would foreclose
trademark-based liability.  A second group of cases would not involve categori-
cal exemptions from liability but would require a much more limited confu-
sion inquiry.  The only relevant concern in these cases would be true passing
off—hence courts would declare legally irrelevant any form of confusion
other than confusion regarding the actual source of a product.  Sponsorship
or affiliation confusion, and particularly initial interest and post-sale confu-
sion, would not be relevant because those forms of confusion would not out-
weigh the significant competition and communication interests supporting
the defendant’s use.
This kind of categorization scheme depends on the fundamental convic-
tion that not all confusion is equally bad and that courts must be willing,
once again, to differentiate among types of confusion.  Some types of confu-
sion are simply unlikely to lead to any real harm at all.  Even where confusion
might lead to some articulable harm, it might be a variety of harm that trade-
mark law should not address—or at least not in situations where other values
point in the opposite direction.  Better differentiation between types of con-
fusion should free courts to ignore some of it altogether where warranted by
the importance of other values.  Moreover, even when courts balance confu-
sion against other values rather than ignoring it, they can treat different types
of confusion differently.
Below we identify a few types of cases we believe fit each of these treat-
ment categories.  We do not suggest that this list is exhaustive—indeed, we
mean for these examples to be illustrative and for courts to remain open to
identifying other defined categories of cases that deserve different treatment
because they systematically implicate important competition or communica-
tion values.  Of the three fact patterns discussed earlier, we conclude that
216 See infra Section III.C.
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product features and most uses in expressive works would go down the first
track, while third-party promotions generally belong on the second.
1. Categorical Exemptions
The first and most robust sort of limiting doctrine would immunize all
behavior within a defined category.  A court would simply determine whether
a defendant’s use of a mark fits in the category; if so, there would be no
trademark infringement liability regardless of any potential for confusion.  As
the Supreme Court has emphasized, these are the only defenses that really
deserve the name.217
Graeme Dinwoodie calls these types of limiting doctrines “trumping
defenses.”218  One could also call them safe harbors, categorical defenses, or
exemptions.  They are routine in other areas of law, frequently but not always
structured as affirmative defenses.  In tort, necessity and self-defense over-
come even the clearest proof that the elements of an intentional tort were
met.219  Likewise, a party accused of breaching a contract who demonstrates
lack of capacity to enter the contract, or fraud or mutual mistake in its nego-
tiation, will escape liability for that breach.220  In trademark law, some situa-
tions also should provide complete immunity against infringement liability
(although, as described in Section III.C, limited remedies may be available
under the more stringent standards of unfair competition law).  We think at
least two categories of cases deserve this treatment: uses of functional prod-
uct design features (with some differences between mechanically and aes-
thetically functional features) and uses within expressive works.
a. Functional Product Features
As we noted above, mechanical functionality is currently the closest
thing we have to a categorical exclusion from liability because it precludes
liability without regard for confusion of any kind.221  But in order for func-
tionality to serve the purposes we advocate here, courts must take TrafFix
seriously, asking only whether a feature is arbitrary vis-a`-vis the function of
217 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004).
218 Dinwoodie, supra note 139, at 151.
219 See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (holding that necessity justifies entries
upon land which otherwise would have been trespasses).  Indeed, self-defense is generally a
complete defense even to a claim by an innocent third party who was accidentally injured
by a defendant justifiably responding to a threat of imminent bodily harm by some other
person, unless the defendant realized or should have realized his actions created an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to others. See Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 83, 87 (1864); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 5 cmt. b (2010).
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 cmt. a (1981).
221 In the formal sense, non-functionality is most often an element of the prima facie
case rather than an affirmative defense because most trade dress is unregistered.  But we
are concerned with limiting doctrines based on their real-world operation, not on their
technical status as a matter of civil procedure.  And in this sense, functionality is a categori-
cal exclusion.
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the article, without regard to alternative designs.222  As the Supreme Court
made clear, design features are functional if they are “essential to the use or
purpose” or “affect[ ] the cost or quality” of a product, and the features fit
those descriptions when they are not “arbitrary, incidental, or ornamen-
tal.”223  To the extent a design feature relates at all to the article’s function, it
is functional—even if there are many other ways of designing the feature to
achieve the same function.
Mechanical functionality deserves this categorical treatment because it
prevents trademark law from undermining patent law’s competition norms.
Patent law strikes a careful bargain: it offers very strong protection, even
against those who have invented independently, but that protection is availa-
ble only for new, useful, and nonobvious inventions that are adequately dis-
closed in an enabling patent application.224  Patent protection also lasts for
only twenty years from the date of application for most inventions,225 unlike
trademark protection, which is potentially infinite in duration.  The func-
tionality doctrine prevents parties from harming competition by evading
these limitations and acquiring exclusive rights of potentially unlimited dura-
tion in unpatented or formerly patented features.226  As the Ninth Circuit
said in Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., “a product’s manufacturer ‘does not
have rights under trade dress law to compel its competitors to resort to alter-
native designs which have a different set of advantages and disadvantages.
Such is the realm of patent law.’”227
Patent law’s limitations promote competition by ensuring that “[i]n gen-
eral, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright pro-
tects an item, it will be subject to copying.”228  And by protecting the integrity
of patent law’s bargain, functionality secures competitors’ rights to copy
unpatented useful features.229  This is true regardless of whether the particu-
lar feature at issue was previously claimed in a patent—unless the feature is
222 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001); Eppendorf-
Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]lternative
designs are not germane to the traditional test for functionality.”).
223 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–35.
224 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
225 Id. § 154(a)(2).
226 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29, 34–35 (cautioning against misuse or overextension of
trade dress protection, in light of patent law’s limitations); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v.
Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[P]atent law alone protects useful designs from
mimicry; the functionality doctrine polices the division of responsibilities between patent
and trademark law by invalidating marks on useful designs.”).
227 296 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1009, 1014 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999)).
228 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29.
229 As the Supreme Court said in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
[t]he attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing crea-
tive effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend almost entirely on a
backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and inno-
vations.  The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability embody a
congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free
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arbitrary or incidental vis-a`-vis the article, it should be subject to the rules of
that realm with their deeply embedded competition values.230  Functional
features, even if never patented, are simply not within trademark law’s
proper domain.231
In principle, we believe that courts should extend much the same treat-
ment to cases currently adjudicated under the “aesthetic functionality” doc-
trine.  Ornamental design features like the pink color of strawberry ice cream
or the layout and de´cor of a quintessential pool hall may confer marketplace
advantages every bit as important as the dual-spring design of a traffic sign.232
And, like mechanical functionality, protection of those design features
threatens to disrupt the balance of other intellectual property regimes—in
this instance, design patents and copyrights.  Thus, we can imagine, and
indeed aspire to, an aesthetic functionality doctrine that mirrors mechanical
functionality and treats certain design features as categorically unprotectable
as trademarks.
We are not, however, convinced at this point that we could identify a
mechanism for identifying the design features that would fit in this category
as clearly as mechanical functionality doctrine has done, with respect to utili-
tarian features.  Unfortunately, we doubt that design patent law has devel-
oped sensible boundaries to its domain.233  Without that clear external
reference point, it is difficult to replicate a strong categorical rule like
TrafFix.
Acknowledging this deficiency should not mean ignoring the very real
competitive consequences that can be created by trademark protection for
ornamental design.  As a second-best solution, courts ought to take seriously
the TrafFix Court’s instruction that aesthetic features should be deemed
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is
the exception.
489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
230 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (“[E]ven if there has been no previous utility patent the party
asserting trade dress has the burden to establish the nonfunctionality of alleged trade dress
features.”); see Jay Franco, 615 F.3d at 857–58 (describing utility patents as “excellent cheat
sheets” for assessing functionality, but noting that “[f]unctionality is determined by a fea-
ture’s usefulness, not its patentability or its infringement of a patent”).
231 See McKenna, supra note 137, at 834 (“[Functional] features fall outside of trade-
mark law’s reach not because of the consequences of trademark protection for particular
competitors, but to preserve the broader structure of the intellectual property system.”); cf.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (“An unpatentable article, like
an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and
sold by whoever chooses to do so.”).
232 See supra notes 112–26 and accompanying text.
233 On the incoherence of modern design patent doctrine, see Mark P. McKenna &
Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2013) (arguing that a design patent system can only be coherent if it focuses on
improvements in the integration of form and function, but refraining from taking a posi-
tion on whether patents are needed to incentivize such improvements); see also Jason J.
DuMont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of the Design Patent Standard,
45 GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2009) (detailing the development of the design patent standard).
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functional when they put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.”234  We think this language should be interpreted to require
that a defendant show that the design element at issue offers competitive
advantages which arise from something other than the source significance of
the plaintiff’s mark.  When a feature offers those advantages, it should be
deemed functional even if it might also have source significance and its use by the
defendant might cause confusion.  To put it differently, courts should recognize
that competitive disadvantage and source designation are not mutually exclu-
sive, and they should give precedence to competitive importance over any
possible source indication.  Courts accustomed to thinking of consumer con-
fusion as the ultimate enemy in trademark cases have instead tended to
assume that any association between the design feature and the asserted
mark’s “reputation” disqualifies it from aesthetic functionality.235  That
inverts the required showing.  Instead of protecting legitimate competition
interests notwithstanding the accompanying risk of some consumer confu-
sion, courts strive to prevent confusion even if doing so harms competition.
We can illustrate our approach with shoe design.  Many attributes of
shoes clearly fall within traditional mechanical functionality—perhaps a dis-
tinctive shape for the sole that absorbs shock from running, or perhaps a
stitching method that lowers the cost of manufacture.  Consumers will care
about the improved performance they receive from the first feature and the
reduced price they gain from the second.  Because these features clearly are
not arbitrary vis-a`-vis the shoes’ function, courts should have no trouble
declaring those features functional regardless of how much consumers might
associate the sole shape or stitching pattern with a markholder who used
them first.236
Other features of shoe design are more cosmetic, but also very impor-
tant to consumers, and therefore to efficient competition.  In these situa-
tions, courts likewise should entertain arguments from defendants that
identify those competitive advantages.  The claims must be factually credible,
of course.  A defendant who copied the Nike “swoosh” logo would have little
hope of demonstrating any such advantage.  It would create likely consumer
confusion, but more importantly for our purposes, consumers would not
demand that design for any plausible reason other than its connection to
Nike.  A court could reject the limiting doctrine in that case and move on to
a more routine analysis of consumer confusion, as it does in ordinary trade-
mark cases.
On the other hand, where a defendant can offer credible marketplace
reasons for the use of a design feature, that use should be permitted without
234 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (citing Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
235 See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067–72
(9th Cir. 2006).
236 Of course, if the features are covered by valid patents, copying is forbidden for
other reasons.  But in the absence of a patent, outlawing copies through trademark law
subverts the patent regime.
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reference to the mark’s reputation.  Yves Saint Laurent’s use of a red outsole
on a monochromatic red shoe clearly offered a competitive advantage inde-
pendent of any association with the Louis Vuitton trademark.237  Without
access to that feature, YSL could not sell an entirely red shoe.  Thus, under
our approach, the court should have deemed the red outsole aesthetically
functional even if consumers also associated that feature with Louboutin.
And it should have done so without having inquired into confusion.
This approach has the significant advantage of focusing the early stages
of litigation on an assessment of claims about market-based benefits rather
than consumer confusion.  As we have noted, we think courts should analyze
competition interests explicitly and transparently rather than submerging
them in anti-confusion reasoning.  Adjudicating aesthetic functionality
cleanly at the outset of a case gets to the key point faster, reducing the bur-
dens of time and expense imposed on defendants who would benefit from
the limiting doctrine.
As we will elaborate below, where the circumstances that accompany the
use of the design feature threaten to cause passing off, we envision other
remedies being available.238  But those remedies cannot be based on the use
of a competitively important feature itself, and they will not choke off all
access to that feature.
b. Uses in Expressive Works
One of us has proposed a safe harbor for uses of trademarks within the
body of “communicative works.”239  Vehicles for expression such as books,
movies, or web sites often will use trademarks as part of their messages,
whether to discuss the mark or simply to include it in a representation of the
heavily branded world around us.  Risk of infringement liability—or more
often the apprehension of protracted litigation necessary to fight liability—
chills speech.  This problem is sufficiently serious that an application of
trademark law to prevent such speech should require strong justification.
But in fact the justification is quite weak, because depicting a mark within an
expressive work has at most an indirect reputational effect on the mark.  It
certainly does not divert customers at the point of purchase.
Consider an example of recent litigation noted earlier, where the video
game Grand Theft Auto included a strip club with some similarity to an East
Los Angeles establishment called the Play Pen.240  The plaintiff proffered a
survey that, on its face, showed some confusion.  The court quite rightly saw
this claim of potential consumer confusion as attenuated—at most, a person
who had already acquired the game might see the depiction and mistakenly
237 See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
225–28 (2d Cir. 2012).
238 See infra Section III.C.
239 McGeveran, supra note 47, at 2307–12.
240 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.
2008).
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assume some connection between the club and the game.241  On the other
side of the balance, the court noted reasons that media content, including
video games, generally deserves strong legal protection to safeguard freedom
of expression.242  The district court and appeals court ultimately held for the
defendant, but the litigation was protracted and involved consideration of
multiple different doctrines.243 New Life Art was even more egregious in this
respect—just as in Grand Theft Auto, the court of appeals ultimately deter-
mined that the depiction of University of Alabama football players in their
uniforms was protected under Rogers, but that decision came after nearly
eight years of litigation and consideration of a wide variety of arguments for
the validity of the defendant’s use.244
It is difficult to imagine how the balance could come out differently in
cases like these, where the defendant depicts the plaintiff’s trademark within
an expressive work.  Given this cluster of cases with predictable results, the
importance of the threatened communication value, and the low error costs
of allowing some increment of confusion about affiliation, decision theory
would call for a cut-and-dried rule.245  Moreover, a safe harbor in these cases
allows judges to intervene to cut the feedback loop between legal opinions
and consumers’ assumptions about connections between markholders and
the art or entertainment in which their brands appear.246
An additional argument also supports a safe harbor for expressive works.
Just as courts in mechanical functionality cases try not to disturb the arrange-
ments of patent law (and we argue aesthetic functionality should do the same
with design patent law), courts in these disputes should limit liability for
media depictions to avoid conflict with the First Amendment.247  The
increasing judicial willingness to protect the use of trademarks within expres-
sive works, primarily through application of Rogers v. Grimaldi, has improved
decisions in those cases considerably.  Nevertheless, we think a categorical
safe harbor would better allow courts to dispose of these cases cleanly and
quickly.248
241 Id. at 1100–01.
242 Id. at 1099.
243 Id. at 1098–1101; E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1027–49 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008).
244 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012).
245 McGeveran, supra note 47, at 2290–91.
246 See Gibson, supra note 193, at 907–08.
247 See Gulasekaram, supra note 174, at 894; Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment
Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. Rev. 381, 447 (2008).
248 Because many of these cases involve the use of trademark law to control aspects of
copyrighted or copyrightable works, one of us has previously argued that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox should be interpreted to rule out categor-
ically claims based on confusion that arises out of the content of a creative work. See Mark
P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. 357 (2012).
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2. Limiting Relevant Confusion
Other identifiable sets of cases also implicate important competition and
communication values, but at the same time present some risk of serious con-
fusion that cannot be ignored categorically.  Courts should identify these
uses of marks in advance as a threshold matter, but then send them down a
different track than the one that effectively immunizes qualifying conduct.
Instead, courts should declare that they only enforce trademarks in these
cases to prevent the core harm of passing off, so that the only legally relevant
confusion is confusion as to the actual source of the defendant’s goods.249
Other more ephemeral confusion-based harms are outweighed by the com-
petitive importance of comparative advertising, descriptive fair use, and
other such marketplace uses of a mark.
Our other fact pattern, concerning uses of a mark by third parties to
promote their own goods, falls into this category.  A recent Ninth Circuit
decision, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,250 takes a somewhat better
approach to nominative use that is more consistent with our recommenda-
tions.  The defendants in that case were independent auto brokers who spe-
cialized in identifying Lexus vehicles for their customers to purchase.251
They maintained web sites at <buy-a-lexus.com> and <buyorleaselexus
.com>.252  The district court had found infringement after applying the ordi-
nary likelihood of confusion test.253  Finding the requirements for the New
Kids on the Block nominative fair use test254 satisfied, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded.255  That result illustrates welcome sensitivity to com-
petition and communication values by allowing the defendants to describe
their services accurately to consumers; after all, they helped customers to
“buy a Lexus.”
For purposes of this discussion, the doctrinal structure outlined in the
decision proves even more important.  According to Tabari, “[a] defendant
seeking to assert nominative fair use as a defense need only show that it used
the mark to refer to the trademarked good. . . .  The burden then reverts to
the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion.”256  That showing by the
249 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 1, at 448–53.
250 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
251 Id. at 1174.
252 Id. at 1175.
253 Id.
254 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992) (“First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable with-
out use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do noth-
ing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.” (footnote omitted)).
255 Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1180–82 (finding that (1) Lexus was not readily identifiable with-
out using its trademark; (2) the defendants did not use any more of the trademark than
necessary to make that reference (at least by the time of the trial); and (3) they had done
nothing to suggest sponsorship or affiliation with Lexus).
256 Id. at 1183.
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plaintiff proceeds under the three-part nominative use test, not the ordinary
multifactor likelihood of confusion test.257  This structure immediately sets
aside nominative use cases for special treatment, but without going so far as
to create a categorical safe harbor.  The threshold test identifies the clear
competition and confusion interests at stake in the auto broker’s use of the
LEXUS mark.  It then moves a case quickly to the ultimate decision.258  Per-
haps most significantly, Tabari shows some inclination to distinguish among
types of confusion and declare some types irrelevant, just as we advocate.
The court specifically holds initial interest confusion (or “momentary uncer-
tainty”), potentially a ground for liability in ordinary cases, inadequate to
preclude nominative use.259  And, as we discuss further below, the Ninth Cir-
cuit limited the remedies available to a plaintiff in a nominative fair use
case.260
Our criticism of Tabari is that its confusion test still entertains too many
forms of confusion, so it still cannot be sufficiently disentangled from the
ordinary confusion analysis.  According to the Ninth Circuit:
The third factor [of the New Kids test] speaks directly to the risk of such
confusion, and the others do so indirectly: Consumers may reasonably infer
sponsorship or endorsement if a company uses an unnecessary trademark or
“more” of a mark than necessary.  But if the nominative use satisfies the
three-factor New Kids test, it doesn’t infringe.261
It is difficult to take this part of Tabari at face value.  If it were really willing to
entertain sponsorship or affiliation confusion, then it appears the Ninth Cir-
cuit was simply declaring by fiat that nominative uses never cause such confu-
sion.  It is, however, entirely unclear what empirical basis there is for this
conclusion, and it is equally unclear what it means for a company to use an
“unnecessary” trademark or “more” than is necessary.  Indeed, this formula-
tion seems to invite factual disputes.
It would have been much better if, rather than relying on a dubious
empirical claim, the court had simply declared some forms of confusion
legally irrelevant.  Specifically, we think the rule should be that a nominative
use does not infringe unless the use is likely to cause confusion about actual
source.  Then the inquiry would not be about the necessity of the use or
257 Id. at 1182 (“Toyota must bear the burden of establishing that the Tabaris’ use of
the Lexus mark was not nominative fair use.”).
258 It certainly does so faster than the Third Circuit’s “bifurcated” approach to nomina-
tive use that first requires a confusion analysis very similar to the usual multifactor test and
only then turns to a nominative use affirmative defense. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing sequence under
which nearly full likelihood of confusion analysis must come first); see also Keurig, Inc. v.
Sturm Foods, Inc., No. 10–841–SLR, 2012 WL 4049799, at *10 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 2012)
(denying summary judgment on trademark infringement claims related to nominative use
because of factual questions about likelihood of confusion); McGeveran, supra note 12, at
91–93 (discussing delays caused by structure of nominative use defense).
259 Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179.
260 See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
261 Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176 (emphasis added).
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whether there was too much use, but instead would be tightly focused on the
only type of confusion that ought to matter here.
The Tabari court’s own hypothetical helps make this point.  The court
suggested that the domain name <lexus.com> would be different from the
URL the brokers used in the case, <buy-a-lexus.com>.262  That intuition may
be sound, but not the court’s doctrinal explanation.  The opinion
unhelpfully distinguished these two examples on the ground that only
<lexus.com> “actively” suggests sponsorship or affiliation.263  It is not at all
clear why one of these URLs suggests anything more “actively” than the
other, or indeed how a domain name “actively” suggests anything at all.
What really makes the court uneasy about <lexus.com> is the kind of confu-
sion it threatens, not whether it does so actively.  In the imaginary case where
the defendant used a domain name identical to the plaintiff’s mark, offered
the same goods as the plaintiff, and failed to disclaim any connection with
the plaintiff, there would be a significant risk of passing off.  This type of
third-party promotional use—but only this type—should be subjected to
ordinary confusion analysis.
The approach we have just described fits comparative advertising cases
more generally, since those cases are really just a species of nominative fair
use.  Take, for example, a case like Smith v. Chanel, Inc.264  The defendant in
that case advertised “The Ta’Ron Line of Perfumes” and stated that “the
Ta’Ron perfumes ‘duplicate 100% perfect the exact scent of the world’s fin-
est and most expensive perfumes and colognes at prices that will zoom sales
to volumes you have never before experienced!’”265  The advertisement fur-
ther “suggested that a ‘Blindfold Test’ be used ‘on skeptical prospects,’ chal-
lenging them to detect any difference between a well known fragrance and
the Ta’Ron ‘duplicate.’  One suggested challenge was, ‘We dare you to try to
detect any difference between Chanel #5 (25.00) and Ta’Ron’s 2nd Chance.
$7.00.’”266  Finally, the advertisement contained an order form in which
“each Ta’Ron fragrance was listed with the name of the well known fragrance
which it purportedly duplicated immediately beneath.  Below ‘Second
Chance’ appeared ‘*(Chanel #5).’  The asterisk referred to a statement at the
262 Id. at 1179 (citing Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Cross-
roads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 122–24, 140, 158 (2005)).
263 Id. (“When a domain name making nominative use of a mark does not actively sug-
gest sponsorship or endorsement, the worst that can happen is that some consumers may
arrive at the site uncertain as to what they will find. . . .  Outside the special case of trade-
mark.com, or domains that actively claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers
don’t form any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the
landing page—if then.  This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.  So long as
the site as a whole does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder,
such momentary uncertainty does not preclude a finding of nominative fair use.” (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)).
264 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
265 Id. at 563.
266 Id.
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bottom of the form reading ‘Registered Trade Name of Original Fragrance
House.’”267
Given the obviously comparative nature of the advertisement, under our
proposal this case would be channeled into the category where passing off is
the only harm addressed by trademark infringement liability.  Implicitly, this
is just what the court did.  Although it claimed that the advertisement must
not have caused confusion at all, it never entertained the confusion issue
once it determined clearly that there was no danger of passing off.  Instead, it
concluded that Chanel’s “reputation [was] not directly at stake.  [Ta’Ron’s]
advertisement makes it clear that the product they offer is their own.  If it
proves to be inferior, they, not [Chanel], will bear the burden of consumer
disapproval.”268
Courts’ failure to make their reasoning transparent requires them to
consider evidence of confusion in every case, which imposes significant costs.
And it hides from litigants the true bases for these decisions.  Things would
be improved considerably (and rule of law values promoted) if courts would
simply say that uses in comparative advertising are not infringing unless they
pose a risk of passing off.  We recommend declaring explicitly that the type
of confusion, not just the amount, matters—at least in cases involving compe-
tition and speech interests like these.
And this brings us back, at last, to the Prestonettes and Champion cases we
discussed in Part I.  It is a testament to the expansion of confusion in trade-
mark law that the same “first sale” facts that those courts could settle using
the inherent boundaries of the prima facie case now require a special limit-
ing doctrine.  But they do, because the shift from deception to confusion so
expanded the types of associations that can create infringement liability.
While we are taking a different route to get to the conclusion of non-infringe-
ment, however, the justification is the same.  Competition and communica-
tion values support allowing a company to tell consumers what it sells.  Those
values can be outweighed only when the resulting harm to competition is the
most serious type of confusion.  The next and final Section explains how we
see remedial structures helping to address these situations.
C. Remedy
Finally, in addition to thinking about confusion differently when faced
with conflicts between confusion prevention and other values, we believe
courts should be more flexible and judicious in the remedies they apply.
This means slightly different things for cases on the first (“safe harbor”) track
and those on the second (“passing off only”) track, but in both instances our
proposals share the same motivation: tailoring remedies more closely to the
precise harm at issue.
For cases on the “safe harbor” track, we have said that courts should
ignore confusion issues.  This means there is no trademark remedy for any
267 Id.
268 Id. at 569.
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such confusion.  But, as we indicated, a more limited remedy might still be
available under unfair competition law.  We borrow here from a long history
of cases in which courts have found the claimed mark generic and thus ineli-
gible for trademark protection, but have nevertheless enjoined certain behav-
ior under the principles of unfair competition in order to prevent passing
off.269  The injunctions in these cases cannot serve as an end run around
genericism by depriving competitors of the right to use the generic terms,
however.  An opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she
served on the Court of Appeals explained:
The subsequent competitor cannot be prevented from using the generic
term to denote itself or its product, but it may be enjoined from passing
itself or its product off as the first organization or its product. Thus, a court
may require the competitor to take whatever steps are necessary to distin-
guish itself or its product from the first organization or its product.270
Courts also can and should make it clear that remedies in the safe har-
bor category may apply only to the instant case.  As it happens, a ruling of
mechanical functionality effectively precludes all future trademark protec-
tion for a design feature, because a proper understanding of TrafFix means
that design features are “essential to the use or purpose” of an article when-
ever they play a role in its operation.271  Once a court renders this judgment
about the markholder’s design, it will apply equally with respect to all com-
petitors seeking to use that same feature of the design.272
Not all determinations of safe harbor protection need have such univer-
sal application.  A finding of markholder acquiescence as to one defendant
using the mark for one period of time with particular facts about notice does
not invalidate the markholder’s rights to use the mark.273  In copyright law,
the statutory exemption for using protected works in face-to-face classroom
teaching274 does not alter the copyright owner’s rights vis-a`-vis any other
use—even other educational uses, which usually must be adjudicated under
the more amorphous standards of fair use.275  And if A defeats a trespass
269 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Blinded Veterans
Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989); King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963).
270 Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1043.
271 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001); see
Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“[T]rade dress protection extends only to incidental, arbitrary or ornamental product
features which identify the source of the product.  If a product feature is functional, it
cannot be protected trade dress.”); McKenna, supra note 137, at 832–33 (distinguishing
between a product’s “arbitrary flourish” in contrast to an “essential” feature playing a “role
in the article’s function”).
272 Indeed, because of nonmutual issue preclusion, the ruling may well be binding in
future litigation against any competitor involving the same feature.
273 See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 31:43 (“[T]he defense of laches or acquiescence
merely results in a loss of rights as against one defendant.”).
274 17 U.S.C, § 110 (2012).
275 See id.
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claim with a necessity defense, it does not permit B to trespass on Black-
acre—or even allow A to trespass later in different circumstances.  In a simi-
lar way, aesthetic functionality need not always be a permanent all-or-nothing
determination, depending on the nature of the consumer demand in a par-
ticular case.  That merchandising companies need access to university names
to compete in the t-shirt market does not mean other universities could nec-
essarily use the same name without risk of liability.  Nor does the fact that
Louis Vuitton cannot stop movie producers from referring to their handbags
mean that other handbag companies can call their bags Louis Vuitton.276
This is important because many judges appear sensitive to the financial
consequences of eliminating legal protection for brand assets.  Courts do not
lightly find abandonment or genericism—two other determinations that strip
trademark rights across the board.277  We think this discomfort sometimes
encourages judges to stretch to find potential confusion in cases involving
other values.  For this reason, our proposal for safe harbors channels courts
to examine the nature of a defendant’s particular use of a trademark, without
necessarily requiring any broad holdings about the nature of a markholder’s
rights in other cases.
In situations like third-party promotions, we also think remedial modesty
is in order.  Here, again, Tabari provides a positive example.  The district
court had enjoined the defendant auto brokers “from using ‘any . . . domain
name, service mark, trademark, trade name, meta tag or other commercial
indication of origin that includes the mark LEXUS.’”278  This is just the sort
of blanket injunction against all use of the mark that courts impose so often.
It disregards the consumer’s interests in straightforward communication
about the types of cars available through independent auto brokers and in
the enhanced competition between auto dealers made possible by their
work.279  In order to prevent the possibility of rather ill-defined momentary
confusion from the use of the LEXUS mark in the brokers’ domain name,
the injunction forbade the Tabaris from uttering the brand name at all—
even if they bent over backwards to do so in ways that informed consumers
about their own services and minimized the risk of confusion.  That was too
much, according to the Ninth Circuit, because “[p]rohibition of such truth-
276 In fact, this same logic would apply even in mechanical functionality cases.  The fact
that a dual-spring design is essential to the use or purpose of traffic signs does not mean
that the design would not be protectable when depicted as part of a logo.  The reason we
tend to think of functionality as a validity doctrine is that functionality cases uniformly deal
with rights to a particular design as against others who wish to use the design as a feature of
a competitive product.  Of course, that only reinforces the overlap with patent law.
277 See TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir. 1997)
(abandonment); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 12:1 (genericism).
278 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)
(alteration in original).
279 Id. at 1174–75 (“Consumers like this [auto broker] service, as it increases competi-
tion among dealers, resulting in greater selection at lower prices.  For many of the same
reasons, auto manufacturers and dealers aren’t so keen on it, as it undermines dealers’
territorial exclusivity and lowers profit margins.”).
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ful and non-misleading speech does not advance the Lanham Act’s purpose
of protecting consumers and preventing unfair competition; in fact, it under-
mines that rationale by frustrating honest communication between the
Tabaris and their customers.”280  Indeed, in nominative use cases, this type of
injunction is almost never appropriate: “If the nominative use does not satisfy
all the New Kids factors, the district court may order defendants to modify
their use of the mark so that all three factors are satisfied; it may not enjoin
nominative use of the mark altogether.”281  In other words, the court must
enjoin the minimum amount necessary to bring a nominative use into com-
pliance.  The only exception is in cases in which the defendant cannot or will
not modify its use.282
Many of the “first sale” cases involving repaired or reconditioned goods
raise concerns about one other type of possible confusion: the characteristics
of the goods, particularly their repaired or reconditioned status.  In Nitro Lei-
sure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., for example, the defendant was selling
both “recycled” and “refurbished” golf balls, on which it maintained or
reprinted the trademark of the original seller.283  As the Federal Circuit
described it:
The first category of balls are “recycled” balls.  The recycled balls are those
found in relatively good condition, needing little more than washing, and
are repackaged for resale. . . .  The second category includes balls that are
found with stains, scuffs or blemishes, requiring “refurbishing.”  Nitro’s
refurbishing process includes cosmetically treating the balls by removing the
base coat of paint, the clear coat layer, and the trademark and model mark-
ings without damaging the covers of the balls, and then repainting the balls,
adding a clear coat, and reaffixing the original manufacturer’s trademark.
Nitro also applies directly to each “refurbished” ball the legend “USED &
REFURBISHED BY SECOND CHANCE” or “USED AND REFURBISHED BY
GOLFBALLSDIRECT.COM.”  In these statements, the terms “Second
Chance” and “Golfballsdirect.com” refer to businesses of Nitro.  Some, but
not all, of the refurbished balls also bear a Nitro trademark.  Nitro’s refur-
bished balls are packaged in containers displaying the following disclaimer:
ATTENTION USED/REFURBISHED GOLF BALLS: The enclosed con-
tents of used/refurbished golf balls are USED GOLF BALLS.  Used/
Refurbished golf balls are subject to performance variations from new
ones.  These used/refurbished balls were processed via one or more of
the following steps: stripping, painting, stamping and/or clear coating
in our factory.  This product has NOT been endorsed or approved by
the original manufacturer and the balls DO NOT fall under the original
manufacturer’s warranty.284
In this kind of case, just as in Champion, there is a concern that the recycled
or refurbished condition of the golf balls be adequately disclosed to consum-
280 Id. at 1176–77.
281 Id. at 1176.
282 Id. at 1176 n.2.
283 Nitro Leisure Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
284 Id. at 1358 (citation omitted).
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ers so that they not only know that they are buying from Nitro rather than
the original seller, but also that the goods they are buying may differ signifi-
cantly from new products.285  We think this concern really sounds more in
false advertising than in trademark, since it is fundamentally about the char-
acteristics of the goods rather than their source.  Nevertheless, our formula-
tion is certainly capable of dealing with this concern through limited
injunctive relief of precisely the kind Champion contemplated.286  Specifi-
cally, while courts should not enjoin use of the plaintiff’s mark altogether in
these cases, they can fashion injunctive relief to ensure that both the source
of the re-sold goods and the condition of those goods are clear.
Structured “least restrictive means” injunctions, such as those in Tabari
and Champion, protect competing values in those trademark cases where we
support consideration of limited types of confusion.  They prevent the worst
forms of confusion, but by allowing continued nominative use of the con-
tested trademarks, they also ensure that consumers can receive facts useful
for their decision-making and defendants can continue to market their prod-
ucts.  The courts thus protect competition, information, and choice—not
solely source identification.
There are many other reasons for restrained remedies in these situa-
tions.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and longstanding practice demand
specificity in injunctions.287  Traditional restraints on equitable power also
require that courts tailor an injunction to the particular harm suffered.288
The Supreme Court has rejected categorical rules for or against injunctions
in patent cases,289 and this principle would seem to extend to trademark
cases.290  Excessively broad prohibitions in trademark cases can even run
285 Id.; see also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947) (discuss-
ing repaired or reconditioned spark plugs).
286 Champion, 331 U.S. at 131–32.
287 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1) (mandating specificity in injunctive orders, including a
requirement that they “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the com-
plaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required”); see also CPC Int’l, Inc.
v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 459–61, 463 (4th Cir. 2000) (vacating trademark injunction
for lack of specificity as required by Rule 65(d)). But see E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding specificity of trademark injunc-
tion under Rule 65(d)).
288 See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“As with injunctive relief generally, an equitable remedy for trademark infringement
should be no broader than necessary to prevent the deception.”); Forschner Grp., Inc. v.
Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-settled that the essence
of equity jurisdiction has been the power to grant relief no broader than necessary to cure
the effects of the harm caused by the violation and ‘to mould each decree to the necessities
of the particular case.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilt-
ing Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir. 1981))).
289 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (requiring
courts to use the traditional four-factor test for equitable relief in patent cases, and refer-
ring to similar practice in copyright cases).
290 See Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 33
(1st Cir. 2011) (“Although eBay dealt with the Patent Act, in the context of a request for
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afoul of the First Amendment’s restraints on injunctions against speech,
including commercial speech.291
Despite these incentives to retain equitable flexibility, modern courts
often grant blanket injunctions somewhat reflexively in trademark cases.292
The model permanent trademark injunction contained in the leading trea-
tise exemplifies this approach.293  Courts do so because they see the eradica-
tion of confusion as the most important element of the public interest and
craft broad injunctions accordingly.294  But at least in cases where the defen-
dant’s activity implicates important competition or communication values,
injunctive relief can and should be much more limited, as it was in Prestonet-
tes295 and Champion.296
And courts should be content to act narrowly in the face of competing
values because consumer understanding is shaped by law as often as it shapes
law.  Consumers adjust to the market before them.  As a result, some kinds of
confusion will dissipate over time.  Current law assumes consumers under-
permanent injunctive relief, we see no principled reason why it should not apply in the
present [trademark infringement] case.”).  The eBay Court explicitly indicated that its
rejection of automatic grants of injunctions applied in copyright cases as well as patent
cases.  547 U.S. at 392–93.  The net effect of eBay on trademark law may be limited, how-
ever, because reframing the allegations that led to liability often will satisfy the traditional
four-factor test. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:47 (arguing that courts already
“rigorously made use of the traditional four-part equitable test mentioned by the Supreme
Court in eBay” and so could continue their prior practices); Jennifer L. Kovalcik, Prelimi-
nary Injunctions in Trademark Cases: Did eBay REALLY Change the Standard for Irreparable
Harm?, 29 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1, 6–11 (2012), available at http://www.stites.
com/content/uploads/learning-center/Kovalcik_PrelimInjuncTrademarkCases_CompInt
Law2012.pdf (collecting and analyzing appellate court cases post-eBay).
291 See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (“[R]estrictions upon [misleading] adver-
tising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.”); Mark A.
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
DUKE L.J. 147, 224 (1998) (“And at the very least, some trademark preliminary injunc-
tions—such as those restricting noncommercial speech—cannot pass constitutional
muster.”).
292 See generally Laura A. Heymann, Reading the Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Liter-
ary Theory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393 (2010) (contrasting trademark law with other areas
of law in which warnings are more readily accepted).
293 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 30:12 (“Defendants . . . are hereby forever
enjoined from using the mark ______, or any mark similar thereto or likely to cause confu-
sion therewith, in the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of _____ or similar
merchandise and services at any locality in the United States.”).
294 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch v. Fashion Shops of Ky., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968
(S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding a broad injunction in the public interest because avoiding con-
fusion is “the paramount public policy underlying the Lanham Act”); Big Boy Rests. v.
Cadillac Coffee Co., 238 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“The policy behind pro-
tecting trademarks is to prevent the public from being misled as to the source or origin of
the goods or services they are buying.  ‘Trademark infringement, by its very nature,
adversely affects the public interest in the “free flow” of truthful commercial information.’”
(quoting Gougeon Bros., Inc. v. Hendricks, 708 F. Supp. 811, 818 (E.D. Mich. 1988))).
295 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369 (1924).
296 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947).
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stand relationships between private-label goods and national-brand goods in
the drugstore aisle, primarily because everyone has experienced those mar-
keting practices for a long time without any meddling from trademark law.297
Given time, the same might be said about claims of initial interest confusion
in online browsing.298  Conversely, if consumers begin to believe that the use
of a trademark in a movie requires the markholder’s permission, that errone-
ous belief about legal requirements supports a perception that the
markholder approved of the use—and in circular fashion gives rise to a
potentially actionable claim of confusion.299  When doctrinal rules eliminate
this possible liability outright, they break the cyclical alteration of consumer
perception.
This is, in our view, one important reason why disclaimers ought to be
considered sufficient in some cases.  Even if consumers sometimes disregard
the legally required disclaimers, warnings, and other disclosures intended for
their benefit,300 we agree with Laura Heymann that criticisms of disclaimers
in trademark cases are oddly disconnected from their widespread acceptance
in other areas of law, where consumers are expected to read and process
warnings.301  Moreover, arguments condemning disclaimers in trademark
injunctions generally proceed from a faulty premise by assuming that eradi-
cation of all confusion is a much higher priority for trademark law than any
competing value such as competition or speech.  In a situation like Champion
297 Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 77, at 797
(explaining how the consumer search costs rationale has led courts to allow private-label
brands to imitate branded trade dress).
298 See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Outside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively claim affiliation with
the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any firm expectations about the sponsorship
of a website until they’ve seen the landing page—if then.  This is sensible agnosticism, not
consumer confusion.”); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note
77, at 822 (“Trademark infringement requires more than likelihood of diversion—it
requires likelihood of confusion.  A court should not conclude that every use of trade-
marks in metatags or keywords does this.  Particularly as technology advances, courts
should consider whether the use, in context, is more likely to confuse or to add to the
wealth of information that the consumer might think important.  In making this decision,
courts should consider whether the defendant was legitimately attempting, in a nonconfus-
ing and nondiluting way, to capture viewers’ attention in the same way that vendors have
traditionally done by placing like products next to one another on grocery shelves.” (foot-
note omitted)); Goldman, supra note 79, at 579 (“[O]nline searches differ from offline
searches because the switching costs online are trivial throughout most search stages. . . .
Internet searchers on the wrong path can hit the back button, pull down a bookmark, or
type a new address in the address bar.  With such low switching costs, few online publishers
will cause searchers to reach the point of no return prior to an actual transaction.” (foot-
note omitted)).
299 See Gibson, supra note 193, at 918–19; McGeveran, supra note 14, at 27.
300 See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 292, at 412–13; Jacob Jacoby & Robert Lloyd Raskopf,
Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADE-
MARK REP. 35, 37 n.10, 55–56 (1986); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech
Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 742–43 (2007).
301 Heymann, supra note 292, at 396–97.
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Spark Plug, the law has goals beyond protecting the integrity of Champion’s
trademark as a source identifier.302  Any theory of fair competition should
strive to inform consumers both that the spark plugs were originally made by
Champion and that they have been reconditioned (communication).  And it
should give consumers access to both new and reconditioned products in
order to meet different aspects of demand (competition).  The balance
between these goals will never be perfect, but there is no principled reason to
tilt it routinely in favor of the anti-confusion interest.
CONCLUSION
Trademark doctrine has not kept pace with the steady expansion of
rights at its core.  As more and more behavior became potentially infringing,
those rights intersected with socially beneficial uses of marks much more fre-
quently.  Such conflicts still arise only in a minority of cases, but the number
will continue to grow as markholders’ rights do.  We have shown how and
why trademark law, and particularly its single-minded focus on the eradica-
tion of all confusion, so far has failed to develop effective limiting doctrines
for cases where a defendant’s use raises important countervailing values like
fair competition or open communication.  When courts disregard or down-
play these critical interests, consumers lose.  For example, as we have dis-
cussed, broad trademark rights can suppress desirable design features,
informative third-party advertising, or expressive depictions of companies
and their brands.  Even when final judicial outcomes eventually vindicate
socially beneficial uses such as these, doctrine often burdens them with the
risk of huge litigation costs that strongly discourage them.
This Article has offered ways for trademark doctrine to grapple with
countervailing values more honestly and more efficiently.  We argue for
courts to identify the cases that raise these issues at the outset of litigation.
We suggest that some categories of cases merit a categorical safe harbor
against liability, while in others courts should analyze closely the actual harm
to the plaintiff arising from a defendant’s use.  Finally, we urge courts to use
injunctive relief creatively in these cases in order to maximize protection for
both the source-identifying function of trademarks and the competitive or
communicative benefits derived from defendants’ uses of those marks.
Both of us have joined many other commentators and some courts who
question the increasing scope and decreasing coherence of trademark rights.
The approach in this Article complements the resulting proposals to focus
trademark rights more sharply.  It certainly does not substitute for efforts to
better anchor modern trademark law in a clear rationale or to define bound-
aries for confusion.  But we should not wait for sweeping reform of the prima
facie trademark case as the sole protection for the competition and commu-
nication values discussed in this Article.  Ambitious efforts may fail, and in
any case they would not happen overnight.  Limiting doctrines affect the sub-
set of cases raising the most important problems.  They provide concrete
302 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128–32 (1947).
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tools courts can use to dispose of those cases fairly.  Forcing courts to con-
front the clear problems caused by trademark overprotection in some identi-
fiable cases probably increases their receptiveness to other improvements.
Finally, even if trademark rights were much narrower, occasionally they still
would come into tension with other interests.  Granted, this represents some-
thing of a “belt and suspenders” method, but for sound reasons.  Robust lim-
iting doctrines are important regardless of whatever happens to the prima
facie case or the definition of trademark rights in the future.
Confusion isn’t everything in trademark law.  It is merely a heuristic to
guide courts in identifying situations where ambiguity about the provenance
of goods or services interferes with the market and distorts the overall infor-
mation available to consumers.  It is a means to an end.  In many ordinary
trademark cases, focusing on consumer confusion continues to work well.
But at times, that focus undermines the very competition and communica-
tion values that justify trademark rights. We need straightforward limiting
doctrines that put confusion detection back in its place—not as the purpose
of trademark law, but as its tool.
